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Model based security metrics are a growing area of cyber security research concerned
with measuring the risk exposure of an information system. These metrics are typically
studied in isolation, with the formulation of the test itself being the primary finding in
publications. As a result, there is a flood of metric specifications available in the literature
but a corresponding dearth of analyses verifying results for a given metric calculation under
different conditions or comparing the efficacy of one measurement technique over another.
The motivation of this thesis is to create a systematic methodology for model based security
metric development, analysis, integration, and validation. In doing so we hope to fill a
critical gap in the way we view and improve a system’s security.
In order to understand the security posture of a system before it is rolled out and as it
evolves, we present in this dissertation an end to end solution for the automated measurement
of security metrics needed to identify risk early and accurately. To our knowledge this is a
novel capability in design time security analysis which provides the foundation for ongoing
research into predictive cyber security analytics. Modern development environments contain
a wealth of information in infrastructure-as-code repositories, continuous build systems, and
container descriptions that could inform security models, but risk evaluation based on these
sources is ad-hoc at best, and often simply left until deployment. Our goal in this work is
to lay the groundwork for security measurement to be a practical part of the system design,
development, and integration lifecycle.
iv
In this thesis we provide a framework for the systematic validation of the existing security
metrics body of knowledge. In doing so we endeavour not only to survey the current state
of the art, but to create a common platform for future research in the area to be conducted.
We then demonstrate the utility of our framework through the evaluation of leading
security metrics against a reference set of system models we have created. We investigate
how to calibrate security metrics for different use cases and establish a new methodology for
security metric benchmarking.
We further explore the research avenues unlocked by automation through our concept of
an API driven S-MaaS (Security Metrics-as-a-Service) offering. We review our design con-
siderations in packaging security metrics for programmatic access, and discuss how various
client access-patterns are anticipated in our implementation strategy. Using existing metric
processing pipelines as reference, we show how the simple, modular interfaces in S-MaaS
support dynamic composition and orchestration.
Next we review aspects of our framework which can benefit from optimization and further
automation through machine learning. First we create a dataset of network models labeled
with the corresponding security metrics. By training classifiers to predict security values
based only on network inputs, we can avoid the computationally expensive attack graph
generation steps. We use our findings from this simple experiment to motivate our current
lines of research into supervised and unsupervised techniques such as network embeddings,
interaction rule synthesis, and reinforcement learning environments.
Finally, we examine the results of our case studies. We summarize our security analysis
of a large scale network migration, and list the friction points along the way which are reme-
diated by this work. We relate how our research for a large-scale performance benchmarking
project has influenced our vision for the future of security metrics collection and analysis
through dev-ops automation. We then describe how we applied our framework to measure
the incremental security impact of running a distributed stream processing system inside a
hardware trusted execution environment.
v
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Security is a cross cutting concern now more than ever. Globally connected information
systems from critical infrastructure to social networks provide unprecedented access to peo-
ple, things, and ideas. A key driver of this growth is the commodification of virtualization,
allowing systems to scale across the world almost instantaneously. System administrators
can manage the deployment and provisioning of many thousands of heterogeneous nodes
through a single code base. Network engineers can verify topology changes and develop new
communication protocols without interfering with production systems. Scientists can see
results from large scale experiments faster and without the procurement and upkeep over-
head of maintaining an in house compute cluster. The availability of near limitless global
resources has had an impact on all aspects of computer science, network management, and
information technology, with security being no exception.
Whether we are designing a new system from the ground up, re-architecting a legacy
system for migration to the cloud, bringing a system up to regulatory compliance, or simply
modernizing fleet equipment, it is necessary to define the criteria with which to measure
the efficacy of the resulting solution. Often the metrics used in these decisions are based
on performance or cost, with security considerations assessed during a separate compliance
evaluation. In this work we consider security metrics as analogues of other system perfor-
mance characteristics like network latency or CPU clock speed, with similar expectations to
establish security benchmarks, sample security measurements over time, evaluate trade offs
between metrics, and verify minimum security levels for a system under our control.
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1.2. Modeling Security
A model is a simplified representation of some entity. As with security metrics in Section
1.3, security models can be defined and applied in different ways across the various areas of
cyber security. Formal methods are a widely used technique in computer science to specify a
hardware or software system as a mathematical model and verify its behaviour[47]. Attack
and defense modeling go hand in hand in many[128, 132, 179, 275, 357, 358, 371, 435] threat
modeling frameworks. Cyber ranges[101] are partially or fully functioning replicas of existing
cyber systems built out to test attack or defense capabilities. Of particular interest in this
work is Mitre’s various[100] data models and enumerations of Common Weaknesses (CWE),
Attack Patterns (CAPEC), Malware Attributes (MAEC), and APT group characterizations
(ATT&CK) which we describe in detail later in this work.
Modeling a system’s vulnerabilities and the reachability between those vulnerabilities
can be found in the literature as far back as 1994 with Dacier[108] formalising the concept
of privilege graphs and representing the translated graph as a Markov Model. Phillips and
Swiler[315] present a separate attack graph generation method that can account for multi-
stage attacks and attacker capabilities in 1998. In 1999 Ortalo[297] provides experimental
results and some fundamental metrics using Markov analysis with Dacier’s privilege graphs,
and in 2002 Sheyner[369] describes how attack graph construction and analysis can be au-
tomated. In 2006 Ou[300] provides an analysis of scalability extensions to the MulVal[301]
attack graph engine presented the previous year, and in 2013 Hong[175] presents further
scalability improvements to MulVal using logic reduction techniques.
Attack graphs show the relationships among vulnerabilities within a system and provide
context to security scans already conducted by many organisations. An attack graph is a
directed graph that captures all possible paths an attacker can traverse within a system to
reach a desired target state. The first node in the graph represents the origin of the attack
and the final node denotes the target. The origin contains only outbound edges and the target
contains only inbound edges. Nodes in the graph between the origin and target represent
discrete states in states network. Each edge in the graph identifies a possible pivot from one
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state to another through either unaltered access mechanisms or successful exploitation of a
vulnerability. The conditions necessary for successful compromise of the vulnerability are
encapsulated in the attack graph vertices, and include information such as network, port,
protocol, and access privilege level restrictions, as well as the effect of a successful exploit
on the system such as privilege escalation or remote code execution. These conditions can
be populated from the output of IA and network management systems, or in hypothetical
cases, can be defined manually.
1.3. Measuring Security
Figure 1.1: Cyber Security Body of Knowledge - Key Areas [329]
Cyber security as a subject is at once broad and deep, covering a wide range of functional
topics and skill sets. The lens through which a database administrator views security differs
from that of a network engineer or an application developer within a particular business,
and these perspectives may diverge from corresponding roles in other industry sectors. Thus,
to effectively communicate any security objectives, it is necessary to understand the frame
of reference from which they arise. In this work we refer to the Cyber Security Body of
Knowledge[329] (CyBoK) Key Areas(KAs) as waypoints while navigating various aspects
of security. The CyBoK project, sponsored by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre,
provides both a taxonomy of cyber security topics, and a mapping to canonical references for
these topics. Figure 1.1 summarizes the 19 top level KAs and 5 broad categorical groupings.
Rather than delve into all the different CyBoK headings here in isolation, we elect instead
to refer to the relevant classes as we encounter them in developing the thesis.
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Cyber security can be considered in terms of adversaries, along with their goals, and
defenders, whose implicit goal is to prevent an adversary from achieving theirs. The pur-
pose of a security metric is to quantify a specific aspect of cyber security, such as attacker
capabilities or defensive controls. We now frame the problem this work addresses by sum-
marizing the security metrics and measurement techniques currently available, armed with
the vocabulary and taxonomy needed to analyze them in context.
Regulatory and Compliance Metrics: The left containing bracket in Figure 1.1
depicts Human, Organizational, and Regulatory Aspects, and within the Risk Management
KA[69] we find the topic of security metrics. Indeed, security metrics are often defined within
the scope of regulatory compliance. NIST’s Security Metrics Guide for Information Technol-
ogy Systems [396, 95], ISO 27004 Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation[7] and
the Center for Internet Security’s CIS Controls Measures & Metrics [99] define the require-
ments for security metrics programs within various industry and government organisations.
These security metrics are generally compliance focused, capturing statistics or percentages
like employee training completion rate, number of hosts scanned and vulnerabilities found,
or system performance complaints since the last patch roll out.
Operational Metrics The right containing bracket in Figure 1.1 labelled Attacks & De-
fences includes security metrics listed in the Security Operations and Incident Response[119]
KA. The measurement processes in the operational area are distinguished primarily through
automation support. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems play a
large role in collecting and aligning system telemetry for incident monitoring and response.
SIEMs provide correlation of host/network event logs, IDS/IPS alerts, threat/vulnerability
feeds, etc, and present a unified view of the system’s security posture automatically to the
SOC. Before the advent of managed SIEMs, system administrators typically filled the role
of security engineers, and relied on hand rolled collections of shell/perl scripts to manage
systems, parse logs, collect or push events, format reports, and issue alarms. To be effec-
tive required tribal knowledge along with proficiency in programming, network plumbing,
and systems management, so changes to the environment or workforce made it extremely
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difficult(expensive) to deliver continuous monitoring capabilities to operators at any scale.
Vulnerability Metrics Common to the 3 interior categories of Infrastructure, Systems,
and Software & Platform Security in Figure 1.1 are vulnerability metrics. The Common
Vulnerability Scoring System[262] (CVSS) is an open framework used throughout government
and industry to report the severity of specific security vulnerabilities in commonly used
software products. CVSS scores range from 0 to 10 based on the vulnerability’s exploitability
and impact, with a score of 10 signifying the highest severity. Exploitability is calculated
by determining the access vector, access complexity, and number of authentication attempts
required to exploit the vulnerability, with higher exploitability values equating to an easier
compromise. Impact scores are determined by identifying the scope of a successful exploit
on the vulnerable system’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Figure 1.2: Veracode Static Analysis Remediation Times SOSS [385]
Static analysis[43] is a common method to identify possible vulnerabilities in software
not included in the CVSS set. Developers can automatically scan custom source code and
3rd party libraries from within their IDE, or include hooks in their repository/CI to check
incoming commits before merging. The metrics produced from static analysis can alert
developers[194] to common vulnerabilities in the code they write. Figure 1.2 shows the
survival rate for static scan findings in 2018.
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Economic Metrics Measuring the trade-offs between competing interests and the in-
centives influencing actors is pervasive throughout cyber security. Security economics[31]
applies prevailing microeconomics models to describe limiting factors for attack and de-
fense agents. The Gordon-Loeb[152] model details an optimal security investment under
the assumption of diminishing marginal returns. In Security Metrics and Security Invest-
ment [59] the authors derive metrics including the return on security investment (ROSI) and
net present value (NPV) over future periods while accounting for different risk management
temperaments. A survey of the economics of information security[33] literature summarizes
potential applications of these economic metrics in many of the key cyber security areas.
Figure 1.3: source: https://www.xkcd.com/538/
Figure 1.3 shows anecdotally one type of situation that economic metrics help us to avoid.
Given an existing defensive capability that already deters attacks (data at rest cryptography
in this case), further investment in that defense will give limited additional value. It also
demonstrates the dangers of evaluating risk based on too narrow a security domain. Defining
an attacker’s capabilities, or threat modeling, is described in Section 1.2.
The evolution of information systems is trending away from a single administrative do-
main with a clear security boundary and moving towards a mix of self-hosted, provider
managed, and remote 3rd party services. This creates unique challenges from an informa-
tion security perspective, not least of which being how to define the new perimeter.
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1.4. Automating Security Measurement
Figure 1.4: Software Development Life Cycle
The software development life cycle shown in Figure 1.4 is an iterative process that,
until recently, was almost exclusively used within the Software & Platform KA. Before the
Agile[45] method was adopted, a single iteration of the SDLC could span several years, with
planning, design, and analysis consuming a significant portion of the up front time and
cost for the project. When a software project failed under this model, it happened because
available funding was burned and often resulted in little or no working code. The Agile
approach prefers faster iterations (often counted in weeks) with less emphasis on up front
specifications. The result is a ’fail-fast’ model that surfaces fundamental problems early and
produces prototype software that may be salvaged and reused in other work if the project is
abandoned.
An ecosystem of tools exists around the SDLC that are mature, actively maintained,
and most importantly (for us at least) almost entirely automated. Design requirements are
captured in trackers that contain customizable metadata like priority, status, and dependen-
cies. These requirements can link to code commits or PRs that satisfy the requirement, or
customer created issues or development blockers that prevent the requirement from being
closed. Unit, Integration, Regression, and Acceptance tests are run by continuous integra-
tion and delivery systems which can prevent breaking changes from entering the code base,
roll back bad commits that do get merged, and deploy updates to production servers as
dictated by the pipeline configuration.
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As an extension (and tacit endorsement) of the automated software CI/CD pipeline
described above, development operations(DevOps) has recently emerged as the corollary in
managing the life cycles components in the System and Infrastructure CyBOK categories.
DevOps allows systems and network engineers to develop, test, deploy, and provision the
supporting infrastructure required by an application in the same workflow, even from the
same code base as the desired application. Maintaining the desired state of the underlying
system in configuration files and provisioning scripts through a version control system is often
called Infrastructure-as-Code, While this is sometimes used to set up bare metal resources like
servers and network appliances, the more common case currently is to provision infrastructure
onto a self managed or commercial hypervisor using virtual machines or containerized micro
services.
Figure 1.5: Veracode Freq Percentages SOSS [385]
A functioning DevOps workflow integrates the application development and operations
teams. The next logical step in this evolution is to disentangle the stovepiped security
evaluation mechanisms built around each of these formerly independent areas. The resulting
field of SecDevOps (or DevSecOps[408]) is not the sum of the security of each part (although
it will likely be treated that way at least until the community converges on which term to
reference it by). Rather, it should trigger a re-assessment of previous security controls and
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best practices prescribed through existing regulatory and compliance frameworks.
For example, Figure 1.5 shows the yearly count from over 33 thousand source code scans
in 2018 as reported by Veracode. While this data is from a single vendor, the results are still
concerning. The median number of security scans per year was just 2. We presume there
is regulatory or compliance pressure to scan at least once per year. Given the percentage
of applications that scan once a week or more is just over 4%, we can also infer that most
customers either don’t have an automated development workflow in house, or if they do have
chosen not to integrate this capability.
Figure 1.6: Veracode Scan Frequencies vs Closures SOSS [385]
While we can’t extrapolate with confidence the closure rates in Figure 1.2 to CVSS
findings, or the scan rates in Figure 1.5 to users of alternative static analysis products, we
can draw a very clear line between the teams that scan their code as part of an automated
development workflow and their ability to address security findings. Figure 1.6 displays
a distinct stratification of response times based on scan frequency. Indeed, the teams that
incorporated a simple static analysis check into their DevOps pipeline were able to remediate
nearly all found flaws before the others could fix half. What we observed from Figure 1.2,
that around half the observed samples only conducted one or two scans per year suggests
that, in this context, they were only able to fix about 50% of the identified flaws after more
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than 400 days. Referring back to the Agile development principals that DevOps workflows
are based upon, we can surmise the relative speed in addressing flaws is attributable to small
incremental changes with actionable feedback after each change.
1.5. Contributions
In this thesis we provide a framework for the systematic validation of the existing security
metrics body of knowledge. In doing so we endeavour not only to survey the current state of
the art, but also to create a common platform for future research in the area to be conducted.
We then demonstrate the utility of our framework through the evaluation of leading
security metrics against a reference set of system models we have created. We investigate
how to calibrate security metrics for different use cases and establish a new methodology for
security metric benchmarking. To support automated and repeatable testing, each metric
is implemented as an independent module containing the computation logic. These metric
implementations can then be called directly from an embedded library, accessed through
a benchmark test with standard interfaces and return types, or managed with a container
orchestration engine. Each test has an associated specification which is used to configure
dependencies and tuning parameters for execution. Specifically, we:
• Provide a methodology for calibrating security metrics against a fixed baseline and
demonstrate isolation criteria for benchmark regimens
• Implement several distinct execution paradigms for different use cases
• Describe validation mechanisms available through increasingly sophisticated modeling
and simulation extensions
We further explore the research avenues unlocked by automation through our concept of
an API driven S-MaaS (Security Metrics-as-a-Service) offering. We review our design con-
siderations in packaging security metrics for programmatic access, and discuss how various
client access-patterns are anticipated in our implementation strategy. Using existing metric
processing pipelines as reference, we show how the simple, modular interfaces in S-MaaS
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support dynamic composition and orchestration. We anticipate consumers will fall into one
or more of the following access patterns:
• R&D: A clean environment for developing and testing metrics.
• Reporting: Measurements are pushed to persistent storage or pulled from a client
into a structured format for charting and analysis.
• Batch: Client asynchronously submits a collection of inputs to calculate metrics for,
with the target use-case being dataset preparation for supervised learning.
• Stream: Client defines dependency graphs amongst metrics and connects these topolo-
gies to data sources for continuous stream processing.
Next we review aspects of our framework which can benefit from optimization and further
automation through machine learning. First we create a dataset of network models labeled
with the corresponding security metrics. By training classifiers to predict security values
based only on network inputs, we can avoid the computationally expensive attack graph
generation steps. We use our findings from this simple experiment to motivate our current
lines of research into supervised and unsupervised techniques such as network embeddings,
interaction rule synthesis, and reinforcement learning environments.
Finally, we examine the results of our case studies. We summarize our security analysis
of a large scale network migration, and list the friction points along the way which are reme-
diated by this work. We relate how our research for a large-scale performance benchmarking
project has influenced our vision for the future of security metrics collection and analysis
through DevOps automation. We then describe how we applied our framework to measure
the incremental security impact of running a distributed stream processing system inside a
hardware trusted execution environment.
This work begins to develop the foundation for a repeatable, extensible security ana-
lytics benchmarking framework, allowing existing and proposed metrics to be implemented
in uniformly accessible ways and tested against standard reference models. Through au-
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tomation we lower the barrier of entry for future research and expand accessibility to client




Aristotle is often credited with founding the fields of natural science in the West; with the
story going that he disagreed with his teacher Plato on the matter of philosophical thought,
arguing that it should be based on observations from the natural world. We consider obser-
vations to be measurements when they are quantified with respect to an agreed upon scale,
or measurement unit. The first measurement units were used in bartering to standardize the
exchange values of different commodities[276]. To measure length, for example, the torso
was consistent enough across people to be considered a measurement unit, from which other
units like the hand, the foot, and the cubit were derived. A quantity refers specifically to a
property that can be measured, in this case length. Although the term is often[118] over-
loaded to mean the amount of something as well, we attempt to be metrologically consistent
in this work by referring to the property to be measured as the quantity or measurand, and
the amount of some thing as the observed value in terms of magnitude and measurement
unit.
In recent years effort has been spent investigating the science of cyber security[212, 355,
361, 381]. In the NSF/IARPA/NSA Workshop on the Science of Security [134] three direc-
tions of research were identified to improve the scientific foundations of security, metrics,
formal methods, and experimentation. In this thesis we focus particularly on the role of
metrics in security research, although well-defined system models and experimentation envi-
ronments both play key roles in the analysis. In this chapter we review the relevant concepts
in security metrics needed to build our framework. Section 2.1 describes methods for repre-
senting different components influencing security. These models are the inputs to the security




An argument can be made that the accuracy of any measurement taken from a model is
limited, and that the only true test of security is in measuring the production system. While
it is possible to test systems in production, these tests can be disruptive to operations, for
example when testing fire alarms in a building or conducting social engineering on customers
or staff. We can recreate the production system on a cyber range[449] or similar dedicated
environment for security testing, without the advantages of or impact on live traffic. In many
cases we can interrogate the production system for values from which to build a model, but
only if the system is in production. Design time tools are abundant throughout the CyBOK
KAs, but the backend models used by tools differs in schema and accessibility, making
integration with security metrics difficult. The role models play varies widely depending
on the area of cyber security, with intrusion detection and antivirus systems on one end
of the spectrum requiring production traffic for testing and evaluation, and cryptographic
protocols on the other end having model based proofs of their security properties (although
implementation is a different matter). The regulatory and compliance frameworks listed in
Section 1.2 are made up of individual security controls, each of which can fall somewhere
on this empirical spectrum. The use of models may be overly naive for some cases, but
where applicable, models enable programmatic access and rapid prototyping, and allow us
to isolate specific security properties for measurement through simulation and analysis at
a speed not possible with live systems. In the rest of this section we provide some useful
models that we make use of in later chapters.
2.1.1. Infrastructure & System Modeling
The OSI 7-layer model[465] describes network communication as a stack of protocols built
on top of a Physical transport medium such as copper, optical fiber, or radio. On top of the
physical layer are the Layer 2 Data Link protocols that facilitate reading and writing frames
to and from the given physical circuit including source and destination addressing (Medium
Access Control), and the protocols that encapsulate/de-encapsulate upper layer packets into
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the frame format suitable for transmission across the medium (Logical Link Control). When
a datagram from the upper layers is transmitted to a remote system, it is encapsulated into
one or more packets at the Network layer, the packets are then encapsulated into frames at
the Data Link Layer, and the frames are placed onto the physical medium. When a frame is
received at the destination, it is de-encapsulated and the payload is handed up to the Layer
3 Network protocol capable of processing the packet. Encapsulation or de-encapsulation
occurs between each layer in the OSI model and adds processing overhead and increased
latency to traffic. Layer 2 traffic is not routable, since routing information like IP address is
stored in the Layer 3 header.
Figure 2.1: Traffic flow between planes
Network device traffic can be partitioned into two planes[202]: the Forwarding (or Data)
Plane consists of traffic passing through the device while Control Plane traffic has the net-
work element as its destination. We consider the Management Plane a subset of the Control
Plane. Forwarding plane components do the heavy lifting in a network device by connecting
incoming traffic to the appropriate outgoing port. When the forwarding element can’t iden-
tify the correct egress port the packet is sent up to the control plane for a routing solution
as shown in Figure 2.1. The control plane can request and process information about link
status and network topology from peers and update forwarding tables in the data plane in
response.
In conventional network equipment the control and data planes are tightly coupled. That
is, the components responsible for forwarding packets are physically located along side the
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components used to make routing and switching decisions about that traffic. How these
systems are laid out in practice varies widely by function and vendor. Figure 2.2 depicts a
notional router. Line cards house the forwarding engine in Application Specific Integrated
Circuits (ASICs), Network Processing Units (NPUs), or even software deployed on virtual
machines. Incoming traffic is read off the port into a buffer, the packet header is examined
to query the Forwarding Information Base for the destination, the packet processor alters
the header as needed, and the packet is forwarded out the appropriate egress port. If the
traffic is destined for the device (that is, control or management plane) or if the FIB lookup
failed, the packets are queued in the receive path buffer for transfer to the routing engine.
The routing engine is typically housed on another line card and connected to the forwarding
modules through the backplane or switch fabric. Control plane services are hosted by the
network OS running on commodity CPUs. The primary purpose of the control plane service
suite is to manipulate the forwarding plane lookup tables based on routing and signalling
information it receives. It maintains the Routing Information Base (RIB) used to optimize
local FIBs and provides the interface for router management and configuration.
Figure 2.2: Conventional Element
Figure 2.3: SDN Controlled Element
SDN systems decouple the forwarding and control plane elements further, by centralizing
controller functionality outside the data plane’s enclosure and introducing a southbound
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interface with which to alter forwarding tables via API. This allows SDN controllers to
scale independently of the forwarding elements and receive state information for all network
devices it oversees. Since the complex decision logic has been extracted from the forwarding
units, the core elements in SDN are simple switches. The result is a control plane that can
optimize the forwarding rules it pushes based on global requirements instead of the limited
view available to conventional devices. This also results in a potentially larger attack surface
and single point of failure.
Carrier network architectures can be decomposed into tiers based on functionality and
proximity to the end users. The Access tier is the forward facing attachment point for a
user such as the radio tower a mobile device connects with or the set top box that joins
a home network to the ISP. The Provider Edge provides the services needed to manage
traffic between the various access platforms and the provider core. One or more Aggregation
layers can be added to consolidate provider edge points based on access density requirements.
Finally, the Provider Core provides hi speed transit between edge nodes.
2.1.2. Threat Modeling
The intrusion kill chain introduced by Lockheed-Martin[179] describes the steps an actor
takes in attacking a target system. The specifics of each step vary by situation and objective,
but the process provides a foundation on which to build and compare models.
Figure 2.4: LM Intrusion Kill Chain[179]
Attacks against networks can be motivated by many factors, but the effects generally
fall into one of a handful of categories[84]. Our threat model assumes an attacker originat-
ing outside the core network boundary intends to target a device within the core network,
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permitting the attacker to view or alter a victim’s traffic. In other words, identifying the
potential for eavesdropping and tampering is the focus of this research, and we address the
limitations of modeling network disruption later in this section. Table 2.1 lists some common
attack patterns against Layer 2 and 3 networks. In general these attacks are used to redirect
a target’s traffic through an asset controlled by the attacker, or to escalate the attacker’s
privileges on systems that interact with the target. We briefly review these attack classes
here in order to present our Datalog models in the following sections.
Table 2.1: Potential Threats
VLAN Hopping ACL Bypass
STP Injection BGP Hijacking
ARP Cache Poisoning Route Table Poisoning
MAC Flooding SYN Flooding
CAM Overflow Packet Crafting
MAC/DHCP Spoofing IP Spoofing
We frame our threat discussion within Layers 2 and 3 of the OSI 7-layer model here for
clarity, but don’t limit our analysis to only these vectors. These attacks often aren’t the
goal of an attacker, but rather enable the attacker to reach their goal through the effects of
the compromise. For example, traffic eavesdropping may reveal credentials for a privileged
account on some other system the attacker has interest in.
L1 Eth Packet (72–1530B)︷ ︸︸ ︷
L2 Eth Frame (64–1522B)︷ ︸︸ ︷
L3 Packet (46–1500B)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pre SFD src dst VLAN len Payload CRC IPG
}
802.3 field
7 1 6 6 4 2 46–1500 4 12
}
Bytes
Figure 2.5: 802.3 Ethernet Packet Layout
Layer 2 Attacks:
• CAM Overflow: Hardware switches use Content Addressable Memory tables to map
devices to the port they are connected to. When frames enter the ingress switch port,
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a CAM table entry is created for the source MAC address and port if it doesn’t exist.
The destination MAC address is found in the CAM table and the frame is forwarded
out the associated port. If no destination entry is found the frame is flooded out all
ports, and the CAM table is updated with the port the destination MAC responds
from. The CAM is implemented in hardware and has a fixed size buffer. If an attacker
can exhaust the CAM buffer by generating enough unique source addressed frames
to fill the table, the switch will flood any traffic without an entry to every switch
port, allowing an attacker to eavesdrop traffic from any connected device on the native
VLAN.
• ARP Spoofing: The Address Resolution Protocol [317] maps Layer 2 MAC addresses to
Layer 3 IP addresses. To find a MAC address for a given IP target, an ARP request is
broadcast to all members of the local subnet. The owner of the IP address then sends
an ARP reply containing their MAC address. RFC 826 allows for unsolicited ARP
replies, meaning that any system on the local subnet can announce that they own any
IP or MAC address without the address first being requested by a peer. An attacker
announcing ownership of an address will receive all traffic destined for that address.
• VLAN Hopping: Virtual LANs allow the creation of multiple logically separate broad-
cast networks over the same Layer 2 switch. The 802.1Q VLAN field in Figure 2.5
accepts a 12 bit VLAN tag to differentiate 4094 possible VLANs, with later extensions
to the standard allowing over 16 million tags. Since VLANs are isolated broadcast
domains, communication between VLAN nodes must be routed over a Layer 3 proto-
col. VLAN tags are written to Ethernet frames by the ingress switch either statically
based on attachment port, or dynamically based on some policy like the source MAC
address. The primary VLAN connection types are Access links which connect a host
to a switch using a single tag, Trunk links which interconnect switches and carry tags
for all VLANs, and the default Native VLAN which allows untagged traffic and is
typically used for management. The link type is configured for each switch port man-
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ually over the management interface, dynamically using a protocol like DTP (dynamic
trunking protocol), or it falls back to the default which is vendor and model specific.
If a switch port the attacker is connected to is not explicitly configured as an Access
port, the attacker can present themselves as a peer switching device (known as Switch
Spoofing) and craft the DTP packets to negotiate a Trunk port, resulting in access
to traffic on any managed VLAN. Another VLAN bypass can be accomplished if the
attacker is allowed to write arbitrary data to the VLAN tag field, which is permitted
by members of the Native VLAN. In this scenario, an attacker can send traffic to a
target on another VLAN by Double Tagging messages. The outer VLAN tag is popped
by the first receiving switch and then flooded out all of its Native VLAN ports. The
inner tag is now read by the receiving switch and the message is sent to the victim.
This is a blinded attack since no response will be returned from the malicious traffic.
2.1.3. Graph Based Models
Vulnerability exploitation can be thought of as a set of preconditions which must be true
for an attack to be successful, and a set of postconditions that become true after a vulnera-
bility is successfully exploited. In this context, an attack graph is a tool that can efficiently
evaluate the set of preconditions that exist in a system and determine if attaining a specific
postcondition is possible. When an attack goal is reachable in a system, the attack graph will
enumerate all sequences of preconditions necessary to assert the goal’s postcondition is true.
When the goal is not reachable, no attack graph is produced. To date, research in this area
has focused on software vulnerabilities. A likely reason being that a large amount of data is
collected and publicly disseminated in the form of the National Vulnerability Database. The
NVD provides a number of metrics associated with each vulnerability along with metadata
like access vector and potential effects.
Modeling a system’s vulnerabilities and the reachability between those vulnerabilities
can be found in the literature as far back as 1994 with Dacier[108] formalising the concept
of privilege graphs and representing the translated graph as a Markov Model. Phillips and
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Swiler[315] present a separate attack graph generation method that can account for multi-
stage attacks and attacker capabilities in 1998. In 1999 Ortalo[297] provides experimental
results and some fundamental metrics using Markov analysis with Dacier’s privilege graphs,
and in 2002 Sheyner[369] describes how attack graph construction and analysis can be au-
tomated. In 2006 Ou[300] provides an analysis of scalability extensions to the MulVal[301]
attack graph engine presented the previous year, and in 2013 Hong[175] presents further
scalability improvements to MulVal using logic reduction techniques. In 2015 Abraham[11]
introduces the Cyber Security Analytics Framework(CSAF) which we adopt for this anal-
ysis. More thorough surveys of the canonical attack graph literature can be found in [209]
and [237].
Attack graphs show the relationships among vulnerabilities within a system and provide
context to security scans already conducted by many organisations. An attack graph is a
directed graph that captures all possible paths an attacker can traverse within a system to
reach a desired target state. The first node in the graph represents the origin of the attack
and the final node denotes the target. The origin contains only outbound edges and the target
contains only inbound edges. Nodes in the graph between the origin and target represent
discrete states in states network. Each edge in the graph identifies a possible pivot from one
state to another through either unaltered access mechanisms or successful exploitation of a
vulnerability. The conditions necessary for successful compromise of the vulnerability are
encapsulated in the attack graph vertices, and include information such as network, port,
protocol, and access privilege level restrictions, as well as the effect of a successful exploit
on the system such as privilege escalation or remote code execution. These conditions can
be populated from the output of IA and network management systems, or in hypothetical
cases, can be defined manually.
The example in Figure 2.6 assumes an attacker located on the public internet with the
target being root access on the internal workstation. The network model provided to MulVal
is shown in Listing 2.1. The hacl/4 clauses define access control rules that depict router
and firewall configurations and dictate reachability between states. The host configuration
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properties include what services are running, the user or privilege level that service is running
as, and any vulnerabilities known to affect that service.
Figure 2.6: Example network
1 attackerLocated(internet).
2 attackGoal(execCode(workStation,_)).
3 hacl(internet, webServer, tcp, 80).
4 hacl(webServer, _, _, _).
5 hacl(fileServer, _, _, _).
6 hacl(workStation, _, _, _).
7 hacl(H,H,_,_).
8 /* configuration information of fileServer */






12 vulExists(fileServer, vulID, mountd).
13 vulProperty(vulID, remoteExploit,
privEscalation).
14 localFileProtection(fileServer, root, _, _).
15 /* configuration information of webServer */
16 vulExists(webServer, 'CAN-2002-0392', httpd).
17 vulProperty('CAN-2002-0392', remoteExploit,
privEscalation).
18 networkServiceInfo(webServer ,httpd, tcp ,80
,apache).
19 /* configuration information of workStation
*/
20 nfsMounted(workStation, '/usr/local/share',
21 fileServer, '/export', read).
Listing 2.1: input.P [300]
The visual representation of the resulting attack graph can be found in Figure 3.9a. A
MulVal attack graph contains three types of nodes: AND, OR, and LEAF. LEAF nodes
(rectangles) describe known facts like configuration information and attacker privilege that
are given as inputs to the system model. Internal nodes generally represent potential privi-
leges to be gained by an attacker. AND nodes (ovals) contain interaction rules that dictate
which facts and conditions are necessary to derive new knowledge. OR nodes (diamonds)
represent derived facts such as transition states possible given all incoming conditions are
satisfied.
A brief reading of the attack graph generated in Table 2.2 and Figure 3.9a from the top
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left:
• An attacker from the internet (node 18) can access webServer on port 80 (node 15)
• Vulnerability CAN-2002-0392 can be exploited (node 20) to allow remote code execu-
tion on webServer as user apache. From here the attacker can either (node 13):
1. Access fileServer directly over rpc (node 10) and use this to escalate privilege
to root (node 22) and write malicious files served to workstation (node 5).
2. OR the attacker can write malicious files served to workstation directly using
NFS shell (node 23)
• Given workstation can access the malicious file (node 26) and the malicious file has
been created (node 5) then workstation can execute the malicious file with root priv-
ileges allowing the attacker to achieve the target.
Table 2.2: MulVal gernerated output
ID Text Type Leaf
1 execCode(workStation,root) OR 0
2 RULE 4 (Trojan horse installation) AND 0
3 accessFile(workStation,write,’/usr/local/share’) OR 0
4 RULE 16 (NFS semantics) AND 0
5 accessFile(fileServer,write,’/export’) OR 0
6 RULE 10 (execCode implies file access) AND 0
7 canAccessFile(fileServer,root,write,’/export’) LEAF 1
8 execCode(fileServer,root) OR 0
9 RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program) AND 0
10 netAccess(fileServer,rpc,100005) OR 0
11 RULE 5 (multi-hop access) AND 0
12 hacl(webServer,fileServer,rpc,100005) LEAF 1
13 execCode(webServer,apache) OR 0
14 RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program) AND 0
15 netAccess(webServer,tcp,80) OR 0
16 RULE 6 (direct network access) AND 0
17 hacl(internet,webServer,tcp,80) LEAF 1
18 attackerLocated(internet) LEAF 1
19 networkServiceInfo(webServer,httpd,tcp,80,apache) LEAF 1
20 vulExists(webServer,’CAN-2002-0392’,httpd,remoteExploit,privEscalation) LEAF 1
21 networkServiceInfo(fileServer,mountd,rpc,100005,root) LEAF 1
22 vulExists(fileServer,vulID,mountd,remoteExploit,privEscalation) LEAF 1
23 RULE 17 (NFS shell) AND 0
24 hacl(webServer,fileServer,nfsProtocol,nfsPort) LEAF 1
25 nfsExportInfo(fileServer,’/export’,write,webServer) LEAF 1
26 nfsMounted(workStation,’/usr/local/share’,fileServer,’/export’,read) LEAF 1
(a) VERTICES.csv




























Along with the visualization in Figure 3.9a, MulVal also produces comma separated value
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formatted output which lends itself more readily to further analysis. The lists of edges and
vertices in Table 2.2 describe the attack graph generated from Listing 2.1.
2.1.4. Summary
2.2. Security Metrics
NIST 800-55[396] describes security metrics as ”tools designed to facilitate decision mak-
ing and improve performance and accountability through collection, analysis, and reporting
of relevant performance-related data. IT security metrics must be based on IT security per-
formance goals and objectives.” This section reviews some of the available security metrics
from the literature loosely grouped by each Cybok heading, along with properties that have
been used to characterize these metrics.
2.2.1. Existing Security Metrics Taxonomies
Figure 2.7: Vaughn’s Security Metric Taxonomy[411]
Vaughn’s taxonomy[411] from 2003 is heavily influenced by federal, and in particular
defense department, perspectives on information assurance metrics. The classification tree
is heavy on the side of personnel and regulatory metrics compared to other surveys, and the
categories draw from military concepts of operational readiness, threat identification, and
target acquisition. The survey makes some important observations about properties common
to all security metrics. These are presented as binary values which may not be suitable for
all metrics, but establishes universal metric attributes we can use in any system.
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Figure 2.8: Vaughn’s metric properties[411]
Figure 2.9: Verendel’s Security Metric Taxonomy [415]
Verendel’s survey[415] is a critical analysis of the claim that security is quantifiable. The
premise is that most of the published models and metrics that attempt to measure security
lack the scientific rigor to corroborate or validate their hypothesis. The scope of [415] is
limited to operational security measurements and assumes measurement primitives include
systems, threats, and vulnerabilities. 90 sources published between 1981 and 2008 were
surveyed (down selected from 140). These 90 sources are then classified on 4 properties:
• Perspective: describes the approach taken to security. CIA, ECO, REL, OTH
• Target: what the source attempts to quantify.ECO, FRA, SYS, THR, VUL
• Assumptions: assumptions made by the source: IND, RAT, STA, ADD
• Validation: how the source supported findings: HYP, EMP, SIM, THE
Verendel shows that some classes of metrics, specifically cryptographic strength and in-
trusion detection performance, are validated frequently in the literature through commonly
understood methods, while the remaining metric classes are insufficiently validated.
Pendleton’s survey[308, 309] approach focuses on metrics that quantify attack and defense
interactions. Metrics from 158 sources are classified as measuring one or more of Vulner-
abilities, Threats, Defenses, Situations. Situations in this case is a comprehensive metric,
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Figure 2.10: Pendleton’s Security Metric Taxonomy[309]
with Pendleton’s example subgroups measuring security state over time, successful attacks
over time (incident rate), and return on economic investment. Select metrics aligned with
Pendleton’s survey are shown in Table 2.3.
Measuring what? Representative Metrics Systemized in Paper Desirable Security Metrics
Measuring System Vulnerabilities
users’ vulnerabilities user’s susceptibility to phishing attacks [367], user’s susceptibility to mal-
ware infection [218]
user’s susceptibility to class(es) of attacks
(e.g., social-engineering)
password vulnerabilities parameterized/statistical password guessability [431, 61, 201, 410] worst-case and average-case parameter-
ized[62]
password entropy[71] password guessability
system interface attack surface [251], exercised attack-surface[283] interface-induced susceptibility







historical (exploited) vulnerability[364, 19] , future (exploited) vulnerabil-
ity [364, 19], tendency-to-be-exploited [343], vulnerability life-time [142,
282, 453, 130, 459],
vulnerability vector at any time†, distribu-
tion of vulnerability lifetime
vulnerability severity CVSS score [of Incident Response and (FIRST) ], availability of exploit
[52]
patching priority† , global damage
cryptographic key vulnerabil-
ities
vulnerable cryptographic keys [453, 130] Heninger et al. 2012 (avoidable via prudential engineering)
Measuring Defenses
effectiveness of blacklisting reaction time [214] coverage[214] blacklisting probability
attack detection power




relative detection power relative effectiveness[56, 55] relative effectiveness against unknown at-
tacks
collective detection power collective effectiveness [56, 274, 55, 272, 451] collective effectiveness against unknown at-
tacks
ASLR effectiveness entropy [363], effective entropy[169] security gain†, extra attack effort†
CFI effectiveness CFG accuracy [Evans et al. 2015], CFI resilience† , CFI power
overall defense power penetration resistance[230], indirect MTD effectiveness[162] resistance against unknown attacks†, direct
MTD effectiveness
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Measuring what? Representative Metrics Systemized in Paper Desirable Security Metrics
Measuring Threats
threat landscape exploit kits [Ablon et al. 2014], malicious network[461], rogue network comprehensive cyber threat posture
[389], ISP badness [193] control-plan reputation[208], early-detection
time[208], cybersecurity posture[456], sweep-time[456], attackrate [456]
zero-day attacks number of zero-day attacks [Corporation 2012], lifetime of zero-day at-
tacks[52], number of zero-day attack victims [52]
susceptibility of a computer to zero-day at-
tacks
attack power
power of targeted attacks targeted threat index[165] susceptibility to targeted attacks
power of botnet botnet size[110], botnet efficiency[111], botnet robustness[111] botnet attack power, botnet resilience with
counter-countermeasures
power of malware spreading infection rate[91] attack power , wasted scans
power of multi-stage attacks necessary defense[369], weakest adversary[304], attack paths multi-stage attack power
[333, 369, 189, 93], k-zero-day-safety
[429], effort-to-security-failure[109, 297]
power of evading detection (no nontrivial metrics defined) evasion capability
obfuscation sophistication obfuscation prevalence[340], packer structural complexity[407] obfuscation sophistication
Measuring Situations
security state fractions of compromised computers at time t, probability a computer is
compromised at time t[228, 106, 445]
S(t) and si (t) for any security incidents
incident spatial characteris-
tics
incident rate [268, 452, 218]; Maier et al., incident occurrence frequency
encounter rate[452, 266, 268, 218]
incident temporal character-
istics
delay in incident detection [for Internet Security 2010], time between in-
cidents [for Internet Security 2010;
predictive incident occurrence frequency†
[195, 249, 172], time-to-first-compromise
[195, 249, 172]
incident damage cost of incidents [for Internet Security 2010] predictive incident damage†
security investments security spending[95], security budget [for Internet Security 2010] payoff of security investment
Table 2.3: Pendleton’s Survey: Selected Attack & Defense Metrics[309]
In the conclusions Pendleton hints at some properties desirable in all security metrics
(additivity) but stops short of declaring these necessary traits for validation, or even enu-
merating the full list of common metric attributes.
Figure 2.11: Ramos’ Security Metric Taxonomy[327]
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Ramos[327] focuses on model-based network security metrics exclusively, and provides a
list of 5 properties distinct from Vaughn’s in [411] which all good metrics should possess.
Again we see validation listed as necessary to all types of metrics. Ramos cites 146 sources
in the survey and consolidates classification to around 75 distinct metrics.
Figure 2.12: Ramos’ Model Based Security Metric Properties[327]
The primary classification in [327] is by target. A metric can evaluate a Process (eg
SSE-CMM), Software, the Network, or the Organization - which includes physical and per-
sonnel security metrics. The Construction Type category distinguishes between empirical
and analytical metrics, the latter requiring some type of model (attack graph, markov, etc)
to perform evaluation. Measurement Consistency describes whether a metric is objective or
subjective.
Ramos splits the set of model based quantitative security metrics into 3 buckets based on
the input model the metric expects (Stochastic, Graph, Other) with other including attack
nets, petri nets, etc. This partitioning is likely to make reporting results easier as, in our
experience, these input models will be produced from the same set of input data. Should
we consider a metric that computes a function analytically and another that estimates the
same quantity through simulation separate metrics? In table IX[327] Ramos indicates the
lack of validation across the surveyed metrics even when the author’s own inline validation
we accounted for. Select metrics aligned with Ramos’ survey are shown in Table 2.4.
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Metric Compliance Moment Consistency
MTTF [107][109] compliance dynamic objective
METF [297] compliance dynamic subjective
MTSF [27], [26], [25] compliance static subjective
MTFF [217], [347] compliance static subjective
MTTC by McQueen et al. [256] compliance static subjective
MTTC by Leversage et al. [229] compliance static subjective
Steady-State Security [27], [26], [25] non-compliance static subjective
Reliability [189] compliance static objective
Success Likelihood [199] non-compliance dynamic subjective
q [232] non-compliance static objective
Shortest Path [315], [182] compliance dynamic objective
Number of Paths [297], [182] non-compliance dynamic objective
Mean of Path Lengths [231], [182] compliance dynamic objective
Normalized Mean of Path Lengths[182] compliance dynamic objective
Assistive metrics: SDPL, MoPL, MePL [182] compliance dynamic objective
Weakest Adversary [304] compliance static subjective
Network Compromise Percentage [235] non-compliance dynamic objective
Network Compromise Percentage [235] non-compliance dynamic objective
State Rank [258] non-compliance static subjective
Cumulative Score [291] non-compliance static objective
AGP [427] non-compliance static subjective
Attack Resistance [425] compliance static subjective
Enhanced Cumulative Score [174] non-compliance static subjective
Liu and Man’s metric [241] non-compliance dynamic subjective
Frigault and Wang’s metric [144] non-compliance static subjective
Frigault and colleagues’ metric [143] non-compliance dynamic subjective
Poolsappasit and colleagues’ metric [318] non-compliance dynamic subjective
Xie and colleagues’ metric [438] non-compliance dynamic subjective
Dantu and colleagues’ metric [115], [114], [116] non-compliance dynamic subjective
Expected Difficulty [148] compliance static subjective
VEA-bility [406] compliance static subjective
k-zero day safety [428], [429] compliance static subjective
d2-Diversity (least attacking effort) [460], [423] compliance static subjective
d3-Diversity (avg. attacking effort) [460], [423] non-compliance static subjective
d1-Diversity (% of distinct resources) [460], [423] compliance static subjective
Seclius [467] non-compliance dynamic objective
Damage risk [88] non-compliance static subjective
Mean Privacy [27] non-compliance static subjective
Security Meter [345], [344] non-compliance static subjective
Policy Security Score [8] compliance dynamic subjective
Probabilistic Vulnerability Measure [19] non-compliance dynamic subjective
Attack Propagation [20] non-compliance dynamic subjective
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Metric Compliance Moment Consistency
ADVISE [228] compliance static subjective
Table 2.4: Ramos’ Survey: Selected Model Based Security Metrics[327]
Figure 2.13: Morrison’s Security Metric Taxonomy[277]
Morrison surveys 71 sources (down selected from 4818) to classify 324 security metrics
from the SDLC. The number of metrics for each group are summarized in table 2.14.
Metric Name Category Paper Method Scale Phase
Mechanism strength Design [241] Quantitative count Implementation
Action Register Access Control [417] Qualitative count Operations
Alphabet Size Access Control [417] Qualitative Enumeration Operations
Authentication Period Access Control [417] Qualitative Enumeration Operations
Block by User Cancellation Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Group Password Access Control [417] Quantitative count Operations
Information about Use Access Control [417] Qualitative Enumeration Operations
Initial Communication Access Control [417] Quantitative duration Operations
Input Visualization Access Control [417] Qualitative Enumeration Operations
Maximum Life Time Access Control [417] Not specified Implementation
Maximum Number of Erroneous At-
tempts
Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Minimum Length Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Minimum Life Time Access Control [417] Not specified Operations
Net Transmission Access Control [417] Qualitative Enumeration Operations
Number of Different Classes Access Control [417] Not specified Operations
Password Reassigning Access Control [417] Quantitative Time Operations
Predefined Users Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Record Length Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Selection Restriction Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Source Selection Access Control [417] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Storage Class Confidentiality and
Privacy
[417] Qualitative Enumeration Operations
User Identificator Access Control [417] Not specified Operations
User Training Access Control [417] Quantitative duration Operations
CVSS Score CVSS [359] Quantitative count Operations
Patch Index Vulnerability [359] Quantitative count Operations
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) Cost [58] Quantitative duration Operations
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Metric Name Category Paper Method Scale Phase
Return on Penetration Testing Cost [58] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Business Adjusted Risk Cost [403] Quantitative count Operations
Daily Vulnerability Exposure Vulnerability [403] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Vulnerability Index Vulnerability [403] Qualitative ordinal Operations
CN Betweenness People [264] Quantitative count Operations
DN Max Edge Betweenness People [264] Quantitative Time Operations
Num Commits Version Control [264] Quantitative Not specified Operations
NumDevs People [264] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Vulnerability Vulnerability [264] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Contributions Version Control [310] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Fork count Version Control [310] Not specified Operations
Number of commits Version Control [310] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Number of hunks Version Control [310] Qualitative ordinal Operations
Patch Version Control [310] Quantitative Operations
Patch keywords Version Control [310] Quantitative count Operations
Programming language Source Code [310] Qualitative currency Operations
Star count Version Control [310] Quantitative ratio Operations
Vulnerability Vulnerability [310] Qualitative currency Testing
Probability Compromised and Re-
paired (PC)
Attackability [252] count Operations
Probability Compromised Not Re-
paired (PCNR)
Attackability [252] Quantitative Classes Design
Probability Secure (PS) Attackability [252] Quantitative probability All
Probability Unpatched Compromise
(PPC)
Attackability [252] Quantitative ratio Design
Vulnerability Disclosure Vulnerability [252] probability Operations
Vulnerability Discovery Vulnerability [252] count Operations
Vulnerability Patch Vulnerability [252] count Operations
Access Complexity (AC) CVSS [354] count Operations
Access Vector (AV) CVSS [354] Quantitative Classes Design
Authentication (AU) CVSS [354] probability Operations
Availability Impact (A) CVSS [354] Quantitative Ratio Requirements
Availability Requirement (AR) CVSS [354] Quantitative probability Operations
Collateral Damage Potential (CDP) CVSS [354] Quantitative probability Operations
Confidentiality Impact (C) CVSS [354] Quantitative probability Operations
Confidentiality Requirement (CR) CVSS [354] Quantitative probability Operations
Exploitability (TE) CVSS [354] Quantitative count Design
Integrity Impact (I) CVSS [354] count Operations
Integrity Requirement (IR) CVSS [354] Quantitative count Operations
Remediation Level (RL) CVSS [354] Quantitative count Operations
Report Confidence (RC) CVSS [354] Quantitative count Operations
Table 2.5: Morrison’s Survey: Selected Software Security Metrics[277]
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Figure 2.14: # Security Metrics by Category/SubCategory (out of 324)[277]
As these metrics are focused on software security, Morrison finds that many are either
normalized to existing software metrics or are extensions thereof. Subcategories of Security
Properties seem to be based on surveys about the listed property but this may reflect the
source authors rather than an inability to automate collection. Incident Metrics more closely
map to previous other’s Vulnerabilities categories as nothing indicates successful attacks are
being examined here. From the paper’s findings, 85% of metrics surveyed have only been
proposed and evaluated by the author, pointing again to the need for metric validation. Very
few metrics apply to design time or test time evaluation in the SDLC - most are tuned for
production deployment. The majority of metrics are subjective, relying on user feedback.
Select metrics aligned with Morrison’s survey are shown in Table 2.5.
2.2.2. A Unified Security Metrics Taxonomy
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Above we reviewed some existing classification methods for security metrics. These in-
cluded taxonomies from both narrow and broadly focused surveys. While there is certainly
overlap within some of the categories and properties identified, there is also collision be-
tween similar sounding concepts from different sources. To remove ambiguity, and more
importantly to address the immediate question, we can map all our security metrics onto
the taxonomy derived from the Cyber Security Body of Knowledge. The CyBoK is an effort
to collect and maintain canonical research across the entirety of the cyber security domain.
Included in this mandate is keeping all of it organized, so we can presume that if there is a
topic in security we would like to measure, then there will be a corresponding topic in the
CyBoK to consult.
Security metrics can be categorized by the area of cyber security to which they apply. In
this respect, the security metric surveys available in recent literature are by nature focused
narrowly on a specific subfield, such as cryptographic or software development lifecycle secu-
rity metrics. To remove ambiguity in terms among surveys, we attempt to include these in a
big-picture view of the field of cyber security by classifying them under the general headings
of the recently released Cyber Security Body of Knowledge[329] depicted in Figure 1.1. By
grouping our security metrics by Cybok category, we can determine our cyber security metric
coverage, and use this context to identify non-security related metrics that would be relevant
to the area.
2.2.2.1. Human, Organization, & Regulatory Metrics
Figure 2.15: Cybok: Human, Organization, & Regulation Metrics
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Figure 2.16: Most of Morrison’s class for Security Properties would fit under HO&R.
Figure 2.17: Ramos’ Objective Type metrics fall under HO&R (economics is cross cutting).
Metrics in HO&R are usually derived from applicable regulations and policies (ISO,
FISMA, HIPPA, PCI, ADA, etc). Often these are counts or ratios that quantify the pro-
portion of assets that are in/out of compliance with the regulation. Typical applications for
these metrics are system audits (how many current users have completed mandatory train-
ing) or accreditations (how many of these secure operations checkboxes does the current
system check).
2.2.2.2. Attack & Defense Metrics
Attack and defense describes many of the security metrics we have investigated in this
thesis. Malware and Attack metrics can quantify an attacker’s capabilities, the DoS’ing
bandwidth of a botnet or the number of accounts controlled are examples. Adversarial
behaviours might relate to MITRE’s APT and CAPEC attack pattern datasets, but I haven’t
encountered metrics that evaluate this yet (although it shows up regularly in threat models).
Forensics metrics typically include time to unpack or deobfuscate a malware sample, or the
amount of time to determine an indicator of compromise for IDS deployment. SecOps &
Incident Response metrics include standards from the literature such as IDS efficacy and
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Figure 2.18: Vaughn’s Organization Security metrics subtree falls under HO&R.
Figure 2.19: Cybok: Attack & Defense Domain Metrics
mean time between failures.
Figure 2.20: Morrison’s Defensibility metrics fall generally under A&D.
2.2.2.3. Systems Security Metrics
Systems security metrics span most aspects of operational security. Hardware and Net-
work security metrics were discussed under infrastructure. Typical applications of crypto-
graphic security metrics include all the formal verification artifacts involved in the validation
of a protocol or implementation, along with performance, key size, entropy, etc. OS security
metrics may be derived from common criteria/ EAL or measure isolation, weakness to side
channels, or number of vulnerabilities known along with severity.
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Figure 2.21: Pendleton’s Situations metrics fall under A&D.
Figure 2.22: Pendleton’s Threats metrics fall under A&D.
Model based network security metrics classified by Ramos[327] are shown in Figure 2.11.
These metrics are designated as Compliance based when a larger value indicates more secu-
rity. Moment identifies if a measurement can be taken pre-deployment and remains static
throughout operation, or if the metric is dynamic and should be measured repeatedly. Con-
sistency distinguishes if the measured value relies on subjective human input or if its evalua-
tion is objective. To compare with network performance metrics like latency or throughput,
these security metrics are heavily influenced by subjective criteria. For example, the re-
liability based models make assumptions about an attacker’s success rate, level of effort,
motivations, and capabilities that could change depending on who is filling in the weights.
2.2.2.4. Infrastructure Security Metrics
Infrastructure Metrics to evaluate hardware security can be found in Rostami’s sur-
vey[338, 339]. The majority of these are incident counts or ratios of expected to actual
values, although analytical calculations (Hamming distances) are suggested to measure the
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Figure 2.23: Vaughn’s Strength and Weakness metrics fall under A&D.
Figure 2.24: Cybok: Systems Domain Metrics
amount of divergence from a known good source in several proposed metrics. Assuming the
gold standard is available against which these measurements can be taken, they will eval-
uate the measurement empirically and deterministically. These metrics are similar to their
performance related counterparts (eg, SPEC CPU) in that the performance increase over or
under a reference system can be represented as a ratio of the two values.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) includes SCADA and other control systems, vehicle net-
works, and IoT systems that fall outside the scope of this thesis but certainly have applicable
security metrics associated with attack surface and information leakage. Similarly, most as-
pects of the other infrastructure components listed above are captured in the system and
threat model and included in the Attack & Defense security metrics. Types of security
metrics applicable here but not listed in the surveys above might include supply chain vul-
nerabilities, weakness to eavesdropping or side channel attacks.
2.2.2.5. Software & Platform Security Metrics
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Figure 2.25: Pendleton’s Vulnerabilities security metrics fall under System’s security metrics
Figure 2.26: Cybok: Infrastructure Domain Metrics
Software security metrics were the focus of Morrison’s survey and apply here broadly.
Typical applications of these type metrics derive from static analysis and test coverage. Of
specific interest in the thesis is the remediation velocity, which measures the time between
discovering a flaw in software and the time a fix has been merged into the code base.
2.2.3. Summary
In the surveys summarized above there were over 500 distinct security metrics identified.
The surveys each provided their own classification systems which were appropriate for the
analysis they conducted, but none of these taxonomies generalize well to classify all types
of security metrics. In this section we have described properties common to all metrics,
identified overlaps in the various taxonomies, identified points of confusion between existing
metric hierarchies, and described a suitable and intuitive system for classifying any current
or future security metric. By using the Cybok as the underlying classification system we are
also able to determine the distribution of metrics in each topic and identify areas of limited
coverage which would benefit from future research.
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Figure 2.27: Cybok: Software & Platforms Domain Metrics
Figure 2.28: Morrison’s Implementation Security metrics fall under SW&P.
2.3. Analytics Pipelines
So far we have reviewed an assortment of models, which describe the syntax and grammar
of the system components we wish to analyze, along with metrics, which capture some
property of security we wish to quantify. To measure a specific security property a metric
is applied to an appropriate collection of model instances. This mapping is usually implicit
in the metric’s definition - a vulnerability based metric assumes a vulnerability scanner has
been run against a system and the results are packed in an appropriate format for the metric
to operate on for example. Obtaining a measurement from input model instances may be
trivial or could involve multiple pre-processing steps. We can think of the steps taken for
a security measurement to be obtained as a processing pipeline for security analytics, and
approach these steps like an extract, transform, load (ETL) pipeline in Chapter 3. For
background we present in this section the analytics pipeline proposed in [9], as it forms the
basis of the case-study in Section 6.1, and motivates much of the developed automation used
in future chapters of this thesis.
2.3.1. Cyber Security Analytics Framework
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The Cyber Security Analytics Framework[9] is a modular process for evaluating system
security. CSAF provides a suite of metrics designed to measure facets of system integrity,
providing a means of quantitative comparison that directly lends itself to system migration
planning. The process follows the basic input-process-output sequence established in the
Multi-host, Multi-stage Vulnerability Analysis Language[299] toolkit MulVal.
Figure 2.29: Cyber Security Analytics Framework[9]
MulVal provides an efficient[328] Datalog based modeling language and inference engine
for vulnerability relationship analysis. The input model consists of configurations for hosts
and networks, principals describing user accounts and privileges, rules governing inter-
actions, and access policies. Information about the system under test is either gathered
through standard methods[301] such as Nessus, Nmap, and OVAL scans or defined manually
for hypothetical data points, and parsed into the global system model using an appropriate
adaptor. MulVal can then make inferences about how the entities are able to interact. When
provided with a starting and ending node, MulVal enumerates all possible paths an attacker
may traverse to compromise the target. The attack graph represents the exploitable vulner-
abilities in a system as the set of connected nodes and edges between an attacker’s origin
and the target.
Once the attack graph has been generated, the processing stages of the CSAF collect
known vulnerabilities, apply weights to the enumerated attack paths, run simulations, and
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compute analytical measurements for the set of security metrics desired. These measure-
ments are reported for each state model to provide a clear view of system security along a
migration path, or to support comparison between competing target systems. The remainder
of this section will describe these steps in more detail.
2.3.2. CSAF Metrics Foundation
Table 2.6: Metrics Summary
Metric Class Description Common Measurements
Structural Metrics based on the structure
of the attack graph; used to
identify attributes like shortest
path, mean path length, or total
number of paths.
SP, NP, MPL
Time-Based Metrics that quantify time ex-
pectations for attributes like
compromise, recovery, or inci-
dent response.
MTTF, MTTB, MTTR
Probability-Based Metrics that associate probabili-
ties attack paths to quantify the
security of the network.
NR, PP, EPL
Temporal Metrics that examine vulnera-
bility age on the system.
TAG
Structural metrics draw conclusions about the security properties of the attack graph
through basic graph analysis techniques[109][297].
Shortest Path (SP):
Given an attack graph, the Shortest Path metric identifies the minimum number of
nodes (vulnerabilities) an attacker would need to exploit to reach the target. Techniques for
finding the shortest path in a graph are well-documented in Computer Science [124]. For
the collection of paths, pi, in an attack graph AG we define the shortest path as:
SP (AG) = min(len(p1), len(p2), . . . , len(pi), . . . , len(pn))
Number of Paths (NP):
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NP is a count of the unique paths that exist on an attack graph between the attacker
and the target. It is a reasonable measure of the risk exposure of the network and provides
a sense of how many options an attacker would have available during a targeted attack.
NP = |p1, p2, . . . , pi, . . . , pn|
Mean Path Length (MPL):
MPL calculates the arithmetic mean of the path lengths on the network as a way to size





While we can obtain some insight into the security properties of different attack graphs
through direct comparison, there is not enough granularity in these structural metrics to
determine the characteristic strengths or weaknesses of the underlying security posture. For
example, we notice that there is a large discrepancy in the NPL measures among the three
graphs; however, we can’t determine conclusively that this makes one model more susceptible
to attack without knowing more about how each model’s vulnerability and exploitability
relate. Effort has been made [12] to introduce statistical methods into structural metrics as
a means for more reliable comparison.
Attack graphs have long been modeled as probabilistic processes[109, 297, 315, 432]. We
consider the movement of an attacker through the nodes of the attack graph as a stochastic
process and interpret the state of the system as the current position of the attacker in
our network. An attacker can advance to another state in the process through successful
compromise of the vulnerability represented by that state only if there exists an edge in the
attack graph between the attacker’s current state and the advance state. The collection of
all states in the process is the system’s state space and corresponds to the set of nodes in
our attack graph. Advancing to another state is probabilistic and the success of the advance
is based on the weighted score associated with that node. For example, from Figure 3.9a, if
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the attacker is at Node 3, the probability that the target will be compromised is only based
on the difficulty of exploiting the vulnerability on Node 1 (Trojan installation), and not on
the path the attacker took to arrive at Node 3.
Because we only need to rely on the current state of the system and not how the system
arrived in that state to determine the next state, we are able to model the attack graph as
a Markov Chain without loss of generality. A Markov Chain is a stochastic process that is
stateless, that is, prediction of the next system state can be made based only on the current
state. This is known as the Markov Property.
More formally, for a stochastic process X = Xt, t ≥ 0, if the attack graph has n nodes,
then the set of possible states, S, for X is S = s1, s2, . . . , sa, . . . , sn. The probability Pi, j
that an attacker in state Xt will advance to state Xt+1 can be given as P (Xt+1 = j|Xt = i)
with the Markov Property being satisfied as:
P (Xt+1 = j|X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xt = i) = P (Xt+1 = j|Xt = i)
The value Pi,j is known as the transition probability between two statessi and sj. We can










must also satisfy the conditions:





That is, if a state has three outbound edges (possible choices to exploit next), the prob-
ability that any edge is followed is 1 since we must proceed to the attack goal after each
time step, and the probability a specific edge is followed is determined by how exploitable
that vulnerability is (the transition probability). This stochastic model enables us to study
the system’s quantitative and qualitative properties through well-established analytic and
simulation methods. Assuming the system state is given as the attacker’s current location
on the attack graph (the vulnerability most recently exploited), we can model the system’s
subsequent states through iteration of the stochastic process over discrete time intervals.
Attack graphs in general have the special property that the attack goal can be reached
from any node in the network, allowing us to model them as an Absorbing Markov Chain
using the transition matrix described above. An Absorbing Markov Chain is a Markov Chain
that includes at least one absorbing state, in our case the attack goal. The absorbing state
can be reached from all other states, and once the absorbing state is reached (the attacker
has compromised the target), no further transitions are considered.
Figure 2.30: Example Transition Diagram
In Figure 2.30 we see a notional transition diagram. The possible states in the chain are
connected by edges labeled with the probability of advancing to an adjacent state (success-
fully exploiting the next vulnerability.) The self-referencing edges represent the probability
of an unsuccessful exploit and occur at entries Pi, i along the diagonal of the transition ma-
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trix. Note that once the system enters the ‘Target’ state no other state is reachable which
we define as the absorbing state.
To create a transition matrix that conforms to the definition of an absorbing Markov
chain, each outbound edge is assigned a transition probability calculated by normalizing the
CVSS exploitability scores associated with all adjacent (next-step) states. That is, if we
are at state Siand the set of possible next states are given as Si+1 = s1, s2, . . . , sn then we




; k ∈ Si+1
This normalizes the transition probabilities for all outbound states of a given node and
guarantees the two conditions for a Markov transition matrix defined above will be satisfied.
The transition matrix P for the absorbing Markov chain defined above can be put into the
canonical form P =
Q R
0 I
 where Q is the matrix of transition probabilities for moving from
a non-absorbing (transient) state to another transient state, and R is the matrix of transition
probabilities for moving from a transient state to an absorbing state. In other words, we can
order the rows and columns such that all transient states precede the absorbing states.
From the canonical form, Pk approaches some limiting matrix |P | as k increases, where|P |=0 FR
0 I
 and F = (I − Q) − 1. This matrix F is known as the fundamental matrix for
P , and it allows us to derive many interesting properties from our system. For example,
the(i, j) entries of |P | provide the long-term (limiting) probabilities of advancing from state
i to state j. Likewise, the sum of the row entries in F determine the average number of steps
it will take to reach an absorbing state from each transient state.
Note that for the transition matrix P defined above, the entry Pi,j is the probability the
system given initial state si will move to state sj on the next step. It follows from the total
probability theorem that the probability the system will be in state sj after exactly two time
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Q2 QR + R
0 1

After 3 time steps:
P 3 =






Q3 Q2R + QR + R
0 1

. . . , and after t time steps:
P t =
Qt (I + Q + Q2... + Qt−1)R
0 1

We have defined Q as the matrix of transient probabilities with values less than 1, so it holds
that Qt → 0 as t→∞ (eventually we will reach the attack target). Now consider the matrix
F such that F = I + Q + Q2 + ...
The values of Qt(i, j) then are the probabilities of the system starting in state si and
ending in state sj exactly t steps later. In this case we can interpret the probability Q
t(i, j)
as the fraction of time period t spent in state sj, so the total number of periods the process
occupies state sj before becoming absorbed is: F (i, j) = Q
0(i, j) + Q1(i, j) + Q2(i, j)... and
the reduced form is known as the fundamental matrix:
F = (I −Q)− 1
Node Ranking (NR):
We have shown that the elements of the fundamental matrix F take on values that
represent the relative duration of time spent at each transient node in the Markov process.
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In the context of our security analysis, these values equate to the amount of hold time we
expect an attacker to incur while trying to advance to the target. Lower node rankings
indicate nodes along the attack path that are relatively easy for an attacker to clear. If
a difficult to exploit vulnerability exists and its associated NR is relatively low this might
be an indication that a security control point is being bypassed. Using the attack graph
and associated NR analysis it is a fairly straight forward process to identify the area of
interest and trace back to the origin of the bypass. Liu[239] examines this process of forensic
reconstruction of attacks using attack graphs in detail.
Probabilistic Path (PP):
The PP metric is another interesting property derived from our Markov transition matrix.
Taking the product of the fundamental matrix F and the matrix of absorbing probabilities
R results in a matrix, B = FR, whose B(i, j) entries yield the probability of being absorbed
by state sj given we started at initial state si.
Expected Path Length (EPL):
We define EPL as the expected number of time steps required for an attacker to advance
from the initial state to the attack goal, and its calculation follows as a direct consequence
of deriving the NR metric. That is, if the NR metric expresses the total expected time that
a process starting in initial state si will occur in transient state sj before ultimately being
absorbed, then the NR sum over all transient states for si will predict the total time spent in
the process before absorption. To take the sum of the values in the rows of the fundamental
matrix we multiply by a column of 1’s, t = N1, and the entry ti contains the EPL value for
initial state si.
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) Time based metrics are a subset of probabilistic mea-
sures used to estimate how long it will take for some target objective to be met[109][297][256].
MTTF is the measure of the mean time for an attacker to reach a target. This measure
directly maps to Expected Path Length as we have defined it.
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
MTTF is the measure of the mean time for an attacker to reach a target. This measure
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directly maps to Expected Path Length as we have defined it above.
Mean Time To Breach (MTTB)
MTTB is the measure of the mean time for an attacker to reach a target.
Mean Time To Failure (MTTR)
MTTR is the measure of the mean time for an attacker to reach a target.
2.3.3. Summary
The Cyber Security Analytics Framework illustrates a specific example of how an ana-
lytics pipeline can be formed from the composition of existing and newly created metrics.
In Chapter 3 we generalize this process as a 4-stage pipeline and show how this can be used
to evaluate arbitrary sets of metrics against each other or against different inputs for valida-
tion, similarity scoring, and benchmarking. In this section we have explored the theoretical
foundations of many of the model based metrics described Section 2.2 by defining
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Chapter 3
Automation Driven Security Measurement
Observation is the foundation of scientific experimentation. We consider observations to
be measurements when they are quantified with respect to an agreed upon scale, or mea-
surement unit. A number of metrics have been proposed in the literature which attempt to
quantify some property of cyber security, but no systematic validation has been conducted to
characterize the behaviour of these metrics as measurement instruments, or to understand
how the quantity being measured is related to the security of the system under test. In
Chapter 2 we broadly classified the body of available security metrics against the recently
released Cyber Security Body of Knowledge, and identified common attributes across metric
classes which may be useful anchors for comparison. In this chapter we propose a general
four stage evaluation pipeline to encapsulate the processing specifics of each metric, encour-
aging a separation of the actual measurement logic from the model it is often paired with
in publication. Decoupling these stages allows us to systematically apply a range of input
models to a set of metrics, and we demonstrate some important results in our proof of con-
cept. First, we determine a metric’s suitability for use as a measurement instrument against
validation criteria like operational range, sensitivity, and precision by observing performance
over controlled variations of a reference input. Then we show how evaluating multiple met-
rics against common reference sets allows direct comparison of results and identification of
patterns in measurement performance. Consequently, development and operations teams
can also use this strategy to evaluate security tradeoffs between competing input designs
(which we show in the case study in Section 6.1) or to measure the effects of incremental
changes during production deployments (which we show in Chapter 4).
The motivation of this thesis is to make modern information systems more secure, and
the driving force behind that goal is automation. Many of the problems addressed in this
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work stem from the disparate ecosystem of tools, APIs, methodologies, libraries, and frame-
works that exist in relative isolation to one another. Consider Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) systems as an example, which provide correlation of host/net-
work event logs, IDS/IPS alerts, threat/vulnerability feeds, etc, and present a unified view
of the system’s security posture automatically to the SOC. Before the advent of managed
SIEMs, sys admins typically filled the role of security engineers, and relied on hand rolled
collections of shell/perl scripts to manage systems, parse logs, collect or push events, format
reports, and issue alarms. To be effective required tribal knowledge along with proficiency
in programming, network plumbing, and systems management, so changes to the environ-
ment or workforce made it extremely difficult(expensive) to deliver continuous monitoring
capabilities to operators at any scale.
We are in a similar state today with network design and enterprise planning. Infrastructure-
as-Code, SDN, virtualization and containerization are all critical components in modern de-
ployments, but the glue that ties them together is largely ad-hoc, and risk evaluation is still a
manual task. In order to understand the security posture of a system even before it is rolled
out and SIEMs are in place, we have created a tool to facilitate the automated analysis,
collection, correlation, and dissemination of the security metrics mentioned above. The ne-
cessity of such a tool is critical to evaluating the efficacy of the metrics reviewed above, and
provides the foundation for ongoing research in machine learning models for secure systems
planning, design, and evolution as demonstrated in Chapter 5.
3.1. Methodology
If we measure an aspect of security before and after a change takes place, then we can
quantify the impact that change had on security. If we test an aspect of cyber security at
regular intervals, then we can determine the rate of change for that property over time. In
order to sample security measurements at regular (approaching continuous) intervals, we
assert that the test apparatus must be fully automated. The necessity of such automation
is critical to evaluating security metrics in a repeatable and consistent way.
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Figure 3.1: Generalized Metric Evaluation Pipeline
In Figure 3.1 we present a general four-stage pipeline for security metric processing based
on our observations implementing a number of metrics from the literature. This abstraction
encourages us to:
• Decouple the source of system information from the representation of that information.
• Decouple the actual calculation of the metric from the input model representation it
is typically paired with in its publication.
• Decouple the calculation logic and supporting metadata from any assumptions about
how that measured value will be used in the future.
In doing so, it becomes possible to identify shared dependencies among metrics, enables
a systematic examination of the characteristics and behaviours of each metric across a range
of inputs, and supports more reusable and composeable components for a greater variety of
deployment scenarios. The remainder of this section provides the considerations and details
of each stage.
3.1.1. Input Modeling
In the Input stage of Figure 3.1, system details depicted above the inbound arrows on
the left are parsed into a model which describes the current environment or environment
under test. Model parameters can be populated synthetically or from a live system. Rules
comprising the threat model which describes how these components are allowed to interact
with each other and with external stimulus can be added here for metrics that require it.
The raw inputs to the processing pipeline can vary widely depending on which security
metrics are being considered. At a high level, we treat the input stage as a black box
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for handling information requests from subsequent stages. This affords us the freedom to
connect static data for testing and experimentation, and live data for production deployments
without altering the contract or interface. In practice input targets can be existing APIs
provided by SIEMs, query interfaces to a configuration database, source code repositories,
vulnerability information feeds, generated network topologies, etc. At this stage we only
assume appropriate adapters exist to make this data available for the subsequent stages.
3.1.2. PTaH: Preprocessing and Transformation Handling
The Pre Process stage transforms the current knowledge base into a format suitable for
the desired metric calculation.
Figure 3.2: Preprocessing and Transformation Handlers (PTaH)
In metrics that compute aggregates, ratios, or simple statistics from findings and system
facts, preprocessing steps may be minimal or bypassed entirely. In more complex metrics,
such as those which consider the relationships between components or vulnerabilities, it
may be necessary to craft the inputs expected from some composition of system facts along
with some composition or chain of metric dependencies. In particular, metrics based on
attack graphs and attack nets tend to make assumptions about the input structure which
can be managed in this layer. We create these structures, score transitions, apply weights
and mappings, and perform any other manipulations of our knowledge base in this layer to
adhere to the input assumptions of particular metrics in this layer.
3.1.3. SecMet: A Library of Security Metrics
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The Compute stage implements the calculation of the security metric and takes the
measurement of the current state.
The surveys we covered in Section 2.2.1 describe properties common to all the security
metrics they consider, which become evaluation criteria for their review. All security metrics
inherit from a parent metric class that defines these common properties and the current
system model, along with housekeeping functions and metadata like citations and usage.The
security metric does not contain logic to create the inputs it operates on, so we can stack
metrics to run in parallel against a single source of facts, or chain them in a processing
pipeline to compose more complex analytics.
Our architecture for implementing security metrics is straight forward. We declare a base
security metric type from which all metrics inherit three methods:
• Check Prerequisites: is invoked either directly by the caller or in the calculate method
to ensure all items necessary for the calculation are present.
• Calculate: returns the resulting measurement
• Get Metadata: returns the environment and ancillary data used during the calculation.
Figure 3.3: Security Metric Catalog (SecMet)
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As shown in Figure 3.3, this design allows us to implement a library of security metrics
with a standard, stateless interface.
The attack graphs described in the literature vary somewhat in structure among imple-
mentations. For example, the AGs presented in [299] include non-exploits along with exploits
as nodes with edges representing lateral movements. In [292] the non-exploit nodes don’t
appear to be present in the publication, although the TVA tool isn’t publicly available to
test this. In [108] and [297] nodes represent system privileges and edges contain exploits
that grant an attacker additional privileges on a set of systems, while in [315] edges carry
probabilities of exploitation and the nodes represent actual hosts. While the differences are
subtle, they are enough to necessitate a general form of attack graph which we present in
Figure 3.6. Our representation of an attack graph is a multi-edged directed acyclic graph.
As shown in Figure 3.7, our implementation allows us to load various AG formats from
graph description language (.dot) files, from adjacency lists as shown in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b,
or other formats as specified. Once loaded, we provide programmatic access to manipulate
scoring and weighting functions, exploits definitions, and vulnerability scores. This allows
for a simple means to test the range of values a metric will generate, the sensitivity of a
metric to fluctuations in parameters, and how well a metric performs on different models. It
also gives us some insights into how well each AG type actually models threat and defense
attributes.
3.1.4. Measurement Reporting
Finally, the Reporting stage handles the response logic needed to return the measured
value and associated metadata appropriately. In our experience, most security metrics return
a single value, although heuristics are also supported as bucket sizes and value count arrays
returned within the accompanying metadata. In these cases we return a value of -1 and a
unit of the type to expect in the metadata, eg array or matrix. The metadata[’value’] key
then points to the resulting complex structure.
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3.1.5. Security Metric Validation
In [415] Verendel finds 4 distinct validation methods used across the 90 security metrics
papers surveyed: hypothetical, empirical, simulation, and theoretical. The author adds the
caveat that no attempt was made to verify the quality of results, only to describe the methods
used in each paper to substantiate the findings. In this section we propose a method for
validating security metrics through empirical means.
In general, a metric should be both reliable and valid, where reliability refers to the con-
sistency of values across repeated measurements, and validity concerns the accuracy of those
values. There is currently no unit reference for a security property which we can use for
establishing the accuracy of our security metrics. We can, however, examine the behaviour
of a metric relative to a given system by manipulating relevant aspects of that system while
holding the other properties constant. For example, we can assign vulnerabilities to the small
enterprise network shown in Figure 3.4a. For metrics that are influenced by the vulnerability
score (such as CVSS based metrics), we can fix the weights of these vulnerabilities in the
range of possible scores (0.0 to 10.0 in the case of CVSS). This would produce the lower
and upper bound for that metric on this specific configuration of system configuration and
vulnerability assignment. Similarly, we can alter properties such as the effects of a success-
ful exploit (remote code execution, privilege escalation, etc), the placement and quantity
of vulnerabilities, the underlying platform/operating system/applications, connectivity and
topology, and so on. By capturing the measured values of controlled alterations to a sys-
tem, we begin to understand how that metric behaves on the given system. Observing how
multiple metrics behave under the same alterations allows us to compare their relative per-
formance without an absolute point of reference. Furthermore, we can extend this analysis
from a simple enterprise network to any number of use cases by supplying input adaptors for
topology generators such as BRITE[257] or simulators like SSFNet[103] and Mininet[222].
Figure 3.4 shows an example reference set of 3 network topologies of increasing size and
complexity. The first represents the type of example network commonly referenced in the
literature to demonstrate a newly proposed metric, and the other two were selected from the
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gallery of publicly available SSFNet topologies and are described by an easy to parse domain
specific language. By including systems at different scales, we are able to determine if a met-
ric’s performance depends on the size and complexity of the system under test. Intuitively,
we would expect the temperature of 1 liter of boiling water to be the same as 1000 liters of
boiling water, so testing against systems of varying size allows us to verify this hypothesis.
If we consider a security metric as a measurement instrument, then we can validate the
metric by characterizing its behavior against a reference set. Some security metric proper-
ties we might consider for validation can be taken directly from the field of measurement
theory. In addition to accuracy and precision, Morris[276] describes several performance
characteristics of measurement instruments that we may adapt to our validation of security
metrics:
Monotonicity: Does the measured value always increase or always decrease with respect
to each improvement in security.
Linearity: For security levels s1 and s2 and incremental security improvement i, is the
difference between (s1, i) the same as (s2, i)?
Range: What are the upper and lower bounds that a metric will assume for a specific
model?
Precision: Does the metric report the same value for repeated measurements of the
same quantity? This is of particular interest in probabilistic metrics.
Analogues to other standard instrument performance measures - threshold, resolution,
sensitivity to disturbance, etc - can be adapted to evaluate a security metric against our
reference networks as well, and it is still to be determined which characteristics of static
measurement instruments are required for their security related counterparts.
3.2. Implementation
Our architecture for implementing security metrics is straight forward. We declare a base
security metric type from which all metrics inherit three methods:
• CheckPreReqs: is invoked either directly by the caller or in the calculate method to
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(a) Small-sized network[299] (b) Medium-sized network[103] (c) Large-sized network[103]
Figure 3.4: Different Sized Reference Networks
ensure all items necessary for the calculation are present.
• Calculate: returns the resulting measurement
• GetMetadata: returns the environment and ancillary data used during the calculation
Figure 3.5: Metric Class Diagram
Figure 3.5 shows the inheritance hierarchy for attack graph based security metrics. Each
AG metric implementation inherits from AGBasedSecMetric which in turn inherits from
BaseSecurityMetric. AGBasedSecMetric includes a property for attack graph which is a
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requirement to perform the metric calculation. Each BaseSecurityMetric also contains im-
mutable properties for the name of the metric, the expected measurement unit for results, a
citation field linking to the source paper where we found the metric, and a short summary
of what the metric does. All these properties plus any additional information derived dur-
ing calculation are added to the metadata dictionary of the metric and returned when the
calculate method is called.
Figure 3.6: Attack Graph Class Diagram
The attack graphs described in the literature vary somewhat in structure among imple-
mentations. For example, the AGs presented in [299] include non-exploits along with exploits
as nodes with edges representing lateral movements. In [292] the non-exploit nodes don’t
appear to be present in the publication, although the TVA tool isn’t publicly available to
test this. In [108] and [297] nodes represent system privileges and edges contain exploits
that grant an attacker additional privileges on a set of systems, while in [315] edges carry
probabilities of exploitation and the nodes represent actual hosts. While the differences are
subtle, they are enough to necessitate a general form of attack graph which we present in
Figure 3.6. Our representation of an attack graph is a multi-edged directed acyclic graph.
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Figure 3.7: Attack Graph Methods and Properties
As shown in Figure 3.7, our implementation allows us to load various AG formats from
graph description language (.dot) files, from adjacency lists as shown in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b,
or other formats as specified. Once loaded, we provide programmatic access to manipulate
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scoring and weighting functions, exploits definitions, and vulnerability scores. This allows
for a simple means to test the range of values a metric will generate, the sensitivity of a
metric to fluctuations in parameters, and how well a metric performs on different models. It
also gives us some insights into how well each AG type actually models threat and defense
attributes.
In the Input stage of Figure 3.1, system details depicted above the inbound arrows on
the left are parsed into a model which describes the current environment or environment
under test. Model parameters can be populated synthetically or from a live system. Rules
comprising the threat model which describes how these components are allowed to interact
with each other and with external stimulus can be added here for metrics that require it.
The raw inputs to the processing pipeline can vary widely depending on which security
metrics are being considered. At a high level, we treat the input stage as a black box
for handling information requests from subsequent stages. This affords us the freedom to
connect static data for testing and experimentation, and live data for production deployments
without altering the contract or interface. In practice input targets can be existing APIs
provided by SIEMs, query interfaces to a configuration database, source code repositories,
vulnerability information feeds, generated network topologies, etc. At this stage we only
assume appropriate adapters exist to make this data available for the subsequent stages.
The Pre Process stage transforms the current knowledge base into a format suitable for
the desired metric calculation.
In order to experiment with different network architectures and exploit effects, it was
necessary to reproduce each step in the process: Install AG suite (MulVal, XSB) → Define
AG input model (Datalog/Prolog) → Generate AG (Java, C++, ANTLR4, sed) → Import
NVD (JSON, XML → SQL) → Implement custom adaptor for Stochastic Model expected
input (Python, inference)→ Insert transition matrix into provided R script (ctrl+c, ctrl+v)
After following this process precisely 2 times we understood why the AG based analytics
community isn’t larger. Our immediate solution was to create a set of ansible roles and
plays to automate the environment setup, test execution, and results collection entirely
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with a single command. This in itself lowers the barrier to entry for anyone interested in
experimenting with attack graphs or looking to (quickly) reproduce our results.
To handle the scale and volume of requests needed to support the advanced use-cases
listed below, we are currently implementing and evaluating the following features in the
SMaaS architecture: Metric Isolation: Each metric should be independently deployable to
allow scaling up and down as request volume dictates. Currently metrics are bundled in
Python and R modules with logical separation at the function level.
The Compute stage implements the calculation of the security metric and takes the
measurement of the current state.
The surveys covered in Section 2.2 describe properties common to all the security metrics
they consider, which become evaluation criteria for their review. All security metrics inherit
from a parent metric class that defines these common properties and the current system
model, along with housekeeping functions and metadata like citations and usage.The security
metric does not contain logic to create the inputs it operates on, so we can stack metrics
to run in parallel against a single source of facts, or chain them in a processing pipeline to
compose more complex analytics.
Finally, the Reporting stage handles the response logic needed to return the measured
value and associated metadata appropriately. In our experience, most security metrics return
a single value, although heuristics are also supported as bucket sizes and value count arrays
returned within the accompanying metadata.
3.2.1. Interaction Rules for Infrastructure
The system model used by MulVal abstracts network infrastructure into a set of access
control rules of the form hacl(_src, _dst, _prot, _port). This hacl/4 is a MulVal
atomic primitive, which to us means that it should be provided as input to the run. Horn
clauses[86] of the form A←− B1, B2, . . . , Bn are the foundation of MulVal’s reasoning system.
Facts (primitive or derived) on the right-hand-side specify a relationship described by the
term on the left-hand-side. Interaction Rules in the framework wrap the Horn clause in
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a tuple with description and labeled weight metadata needed for attack graph processing
and rendering. We use the terms interchangeably within this paper unless otherwise noted,
and present the unwrapped form when discussing interaction rules for clarity. The following
Horn clause derives facts about network accessibility:
netAccess(P, H1, H2, Protocol, Port) :- execCode(P, H1 _User),
hacl(H1, H2, Protocol, Port).
This statement can be read: Principal P has network access from host H1 to host H2 on
Port using Protocol if P can execute code on H1 as User and H1 has access to H2
over that Port and Protocol. An interaction rule provides results for a single query on a
relationship. A logic program is a collection of Horn clauses sufficient to cover a desired query
space. In MulVal, meta(attackGoal(_)) is defined up front as the program objective, with





4 primitive(vulExists(_host, _vulID, _program)).
5 primitive(vulProperty(_vulID, _range, _consequence)).
6 primitive(hacl(_src, _dst, _prot, _port)).
7 primitive(attackerLocated(_host)).
8 primitive(hasAccount(_principal, _host, _account)).
9 primitive(networkServiceInfo(_host, _program, _protocol, _port, _user)).
10 primitive(setuidProgramInfo(_host, _program, _owner)).
11 primitive(nfsExportInfo(_server, _path, _access, _client)).
12 primitive(nfsMounted(_client, _clientpath, _server, _serverpath, _access)).
13 primitive(localFileProtection(_host, _user, _access, _path)).












25 derived(accessMaliciousInput(_host, _principal, _program)).
26 derived(principalCompromised(_victim)).
27 derived(dos(_host)).
28 derived(logInService(_host, _protocol, _port)).
Listing 3.1: Mulval Primitive and Derived Facts
There is no explicit definition for network infrastructure in MulVal, but there is also no
syntax requirement to adhere to the variable naming semantics. Remember that Prolog vari-
ables begin with either an upper case letter, or an underscore (’ ’), and that constants begin
with lower case letters. Thus we are free to overload the existing hacl/4, and netAccess/4
predicates to define the Layer 2 and 3 network elements for our desired system model.
hacl(sw1_xe_1_0_2, sw2_xe_1_1_1, vlan, ac_10_20).
hacl(sw1_et_1_0_1, sw_et_1_0_2, vlan, tr_30).
hacl(st2_ge_1_0_2, sw1_ge_1_1_1, vlan, mgmt_1).
hacl(rt2_ge_1_1_2, _, bgp, 179).
hacl(rt2_ge_1_1_2, ospf_grp_1, ospf, 179).
hacl(rt3_ge_1_1_2, ospf_grp_1, ospf, 179).
We are aware of efforts[40, 168] to define these network elements as extensions to MulVal;
however, we find the existing Datalog structures sufficient for our analysis without modifying
the underlying model. We briefly discuss our reasoning and refer to the core and edge network
designs found in [125] for reference.
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MulVal is primarily concerned with application layer attacks, with the primary effects of
a successful attack being remote code execution and privilege escalation. In core and transit
networks, the target is typically DoS, hijacking, or eavesdropping.The types of attacks we
intend to model influence our syntax decisions.
For example, we can describe switches and routers along with their associated protocols
without modification of the existing MulVal rules. This makes intuitive sense since the
distinction between these devices becomes less clear when their functionality is virtualized.
Having a VM running OpenVSwitch talking to a Layer 3 physical switch over Spanning
Tree Protocol shouldn’t require separate definitions from Layer 2 switches participating
in the same protocol. Note this doesn’t imply the attack surfaces are the same, and in
Secion 2 we make this distinction explicitly. In the examples above we show how existing
hacl/4 primitives can be used to specify VLAN tagged switch ports and OSPF areas for
routers ports. The general naming convention to describe elements is underscore delimited,
with the first entry describing the element (rt: router, sw: switch, rr: route reflector, ce:
customer edge, pe: provider edge, p: provider core). Remaining fields identify the line card,
interface, and port uniquely in a device and can be inherited from the organizations standard
nomenclature.
MulVal assumes attacker privilege is monotonically increasing, meaning that through
the course of an attack an intruder can not decrease system access through vulnerability
exploitation. This is a known[299, Ch 2.6] effect inherited from Datalog and largely precludes
the study of denial-of-service type attacks using the CSAF. That said, the types of attacks
we can model using existing constructs still cover a broad range of Layer 2 and Layer 3
vulnerability classes which we define specifically in Section 2.
Defining the router interfaces as unique host entries with distinct hacl/4 parameters
permits us to treat exploit consequences like we would any other system. As an example,
consider a provider edge router with an improperly configured access control list. If an
attacker located within the attached customer edge network can discover this configuration
error, the model reflects the new netAccess/5 state. In some tests we declare control, data,
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and management plane interface groups for each device to represent interface groups for
simplicity. This naively represents the functionality an attacker would potentially target.
By modeling the infrastructure devices this way we can define services on any plane as
networkService/5 and express a compromise leading to unauthorized access of a different
plane clearly for use in our trace analysis.
3.2.2. Development & Testing Environment Setup Automation
One of the difficulties we encountered when trying to reproduce results from other pa-
pers was setting up the environment and running a test quickly. We created a set of ansi-
ble[160] roles and playbooks to provision the environment and automate executing experi-
ment pipelines for multiple input models. The roles we created set up a clean environment
with the attack graph engine and dependencies installed. In some cases the components
are no longer actively maintained, so automating the deployment with ansible provides a
reproducible environment that allows us to fix dependencies at the required version, track
patches necessary to accommodate ongoing updates to linked projects, and maintain and
deploy custom rules all under version control. The playbooks we developed allow us to cus-
tomize the analysis pipeline by simply including modules for each step in the process. As
shown in Listing 3.2, task lists representing modules can be as granular as necessary. Exe-
cution dependencies are defined by tags, allowing us to specify run targets and requirements
selectively. For example, we can avoid duplicating time consuming tasks like downloading
and preparing the CVSS DB, set the environment to a known state for development and de-
bugging, or prepare and deploy results for consumption by other tools such as SIEM systems
or monitoring dashboards.
1 hosts: all




6 role: ansible role mysql # NVD CVSS DB
7 role: ansible role mulval # setup MulVal, XSB, etc
8 tasks:
9 include tasks: setup . yml # deploy model,update NVD
10 tags: [ models, run, db]
11 include tasks: run. yml # generate attack graphs
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Figure 3.8: CSAF playbook
12 tags: [ run, cleanup ]
Listing 3.2: Ansible play
When preparing the target system, a directory containing the MulVal models to analyze
is expected. These models are copied to the target system in individual directories since we
can’t control the output file names chosen by MulVal without modifying the distribution.
When preparing the target system, a directory containing the MulVal models to analyze is
expected. These models are copied to the target system in individual directories as shown in
Listing 3.3 since we can’t control the output file names chosen by MulVal without modifying
the distribution.
13 name: copy models to remote in individual directories (mulval output is noisy )
14 copy:
15 src: "{{item.path | relpath('{{mulval_models_src}}')}}"
16 dest: "{{mulval_models_dir}}/{{(item.path|basename|splitext)[0]}}"
17 with items: "{{find_results.files}}"
18 tags: [ models, run]
Listing 3.3: MulVal distinct run dirs
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MulVal supports a single custom interaction rules file being passed as a runtime argument.
To allow for a more customizable custom rules set, we allow for the rules defined per model
or globally as shown in Listing 3.4. Assuming the custom rules are defined in separate files
in the mulval custom rules dir directory, we can provide a list of rules for each model we
are testing, concatenate all rules in the directory for every test, or omit custom rules for the
test altogether.
19 name: run mulval (all rules )




23 with items: " {{ find_results.files }} "
24 tags: run
25 when: custom rules strategy == 'all'
26 name: run mulval ( each rule )
27 shell: bash lc "{{mulval_home}}/utils/graph_gen.sh {{ item.path|basename }} -p -v -a {{
custom_rules_dir}}/{{ item.path|basename }}.rules "
28 args:
29 chdir: "{{(item.path|dirname)}}"
30 with items: " {{ find_results.files }} "
31 tags: run
32 when: custom rules strategy == 'each'
33 name: run mulval (no rules )
34 shell: bash lc "{{mulval_home}}/utils/graph_gen.sh {{ item.path|basename }} -p -v"
35 args:
36 chdir: "{{(item.path|dirname)}}"
37 with items: " {{ find_results.files }} "
38 tags: run
39 when: custom rules strategy == 'none'
Listing 3.4: Custom rule strategies
Once processing has completed, results are collected by simply transferring them to
the desired location. Adding enhanced reporting and alerting capabilities as new results
arrive can be achieved using a variety of monitoring tools (eg., inotify, db triggers, fluentd)
depending on the destination. As shown in Listing 3.5. Adding enhanced reporting and
alerting capabilities as new results arrive can be achieved using a variety of monitoring tools
(eg., inotify, db triggers, fluentd) depending on the destination.
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45 #with_items: "{{ find_results.files}}"
46 tags: [ run, collect ]
Listing 3.5: Collect Results
3.2.3. Graph Reduction
MulVal produces multiple output files when it generates an attack graph. The following
section documents the process used to generate the transition matrix required for input to
the CSAF using the output from MulVal. Running MulVal with the -l or -v option will
create the necessary output files.
Require: ARCS.CSV and VERTICES.CSV
for vertex in VERTICES.CSV do
parseVertex() {store NodeID, NodeType, and NodeText}
end for
for arc in ARCS.CSV do
parseArc() { store immediate predecessors and successors}
end for
n = count(orNodes) {*only include exploitable OR nodes}
tmatrix = zeroes(n,n) {initialize nxn matrix with 0’s}
for each OR node do
for each parent OR node do
tmatrix[parentOR][currentOR]= exploit success probability
end for
tmatrix[currentOR][currentOR]= exploit failure probability
end for
return TransitionMatrix.csv
Algorithm 1: Calculate Transition Matrix
To demonstrate, we calculate the transition matrix for the simple attack graph example
included with the MulVal package and documented in Section 2.1.3. We adopt the loop
removal approaches put forth in [300] to discard cycles in the attack graph before translating
to the transition matrix. Logic reduction techniques have been identified in [175] to reduce
the state space of the attack graph. Our implementation follows the methodology implied in
[9] by coalescing nodes that are reachable post-exploit without requiring further compromise
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(so called ’multihop access’ nodes) to further reduce state space. Also, while the effects
of various CVSS based weighting schemes are explored in [362], our design uses a simple
normalized average when assigning probabilities among multiple outbound vulnerabilities.
Tables 2.2a and 2.2b give the MulVal output generated for the attack graph nodes and
edges shown in Figure 3.9. The resulting unweighted transition matrix is shown in Table
3.1a. This is a square nxn matrix which contains only OR nodes that can be reached through
successful exploitation. Referring again to Figure 3.9a:
1. Node 0 is the attacker’s origin
2. From node 0, only node 13 is reachable
3. From node 13, either node 10 or node 5 can be reached
• Node 10 is immediately available given the attacker’s current privilege level, so
no exploit is necessary. We coalesce this node in the path between node 13 and
node 8 in the transition matrix.
• Node 5 is directly reachable from node 13 and node 8
4. Node 3 is only reachable from node 5
5. Node 1 (target) is only reachable from node 3
Table 3.1: Transition Matrix
NodeID 0 13 8 5 3 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 1 1 0 0
8 0 0 1 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 1 1 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
(a) unweighted transition matrix
0 13 8 5 3 1
0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.24 0.22 0.55 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.29 0.71 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.62 0.38 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
(b) weighted transition matrix P
We see the unweighted transition matrix in Table 3.1a is a direct transcription of the
vulnerable nodes in the attack graph and their reachability. In the next step we assign
probabilities of successful exploitation for use in simulations, so the diagonal is populated
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with 1’s here to hold the probability an attacker fails to compromise the subsequent step
and remains at the current state.
Following the simple weighting strategy identified in [9] we let the probabilities of the
transition matrix P be determined by p(i, j) =
ej∑n
k=1 ek
where n is the number of outgoing
edges from a given state i, and j is the exploitability score for a vulnerability in state j
determined by its CVSS value.
In the event a CVSS score is unavailable in the NVD, we provide several mechanisms to
control the weight assigned to transitions by taking advantage of the ’hypothetical vulnerabil-
ity’ capabilities built into MulVal. For example, ’CAN-2002-0392’ uses the (now deprecated)
CANdidate prefix for the ’CVE-2002-0392’ vulnerability and is not found in the current
NVD database sync. Often products with a large user base will maintain their own list
of public vulnerabilities that don’t get assigned a CVE identifier. So, to specify individual
vulnerability identifiers and scores (or to override existing ones) we can load a dictionary of
vulnerabilities from configuration that will be checked before looking up values in the local
NVD instance. We also allow default scores for individual vulnerability classes (eg ’Trojan
horse installation’) and the ability to define a catchall score or ’alert and exit’ mechanism if
no matching vulnerability is found. For the following manually entered exploitability scores
we obtain the weighted transition matrix found in Table 3.1b:
• ’CAN-2002-0392’ = 7.5
• ’direct network access’ = 10
• ’NFS shell’ = 9.5
• ’execCode implies file access’ = 7.8
• ’NFS semantics’ = 9.6
• ’Trojan horse installation’ = 5
• ’vulID’ = 1 # fallback value for undefined vulnerabilities
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Table 3.2: Weighted transition matrix P
15 13 8 5 3 1
0.571 0.428 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.416 0.055 0.527 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.113 0.886 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.473 0.526 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.657 0.342
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Starting at the top row, from node 15 (direct internet access) an attacker can attempt
to exploit node 13 (remote code execution). The probability the attack is successful is
7.5
7.5+10
= 0.42857 . . . and the probability the attack fails is 1− 7.5
7.5+10
= 0.5714 . . . Obviously
care should be taken when assigning exploitability scores to hypothetical vulnerabilities to
yield a sufficiently realistic view of the network security posture. We have designed the
framework to be configurable both in the weights assigned to vulnerability classes and to
the weighting strategy in general as described in Section 3. The portions of this paper
implementing CSAF directly use the weighting strategy described in here, although the
benchmarking results presented in Section 4.5.1 find surface some issues with this strategy.
3.3. Results
In this section we describe our proof of concept implementation of the pipeline shown in
Figure 3.1 and demonstrate how it can be used to address some current issues in security
measurement research. We provide an example environment for metric development and
evaluation. We create a library of select security metrics from the literature and build up
reusable processing components for end-to-end automation of the pipeline. We then demon-
strate the utility of the framework with two motivating examples. In the first case we develop
a simple validation methodology for security metrics. Then we describe a distributed stream
processing architecture for deploying security metrics in production, and discuss practical
considerations for scaling, securing, and managing dependencies in the metric pipeline.. The
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entire workflow can be thought of in terms of the well-known extract, transform, load (ETL)
process, which opens up a variety of design, implementation, and deployment options. Our
goal in this section therefore is to describe contributions specific to security metrics analysis,
where adherence to the literature is prioritized above computational optimization and effi-
ciency. In Section 3.2.2 we described how to use ansible as a driver to control process flows
which easily creates a clean environment suitable for development and testing of pipeline
components like interaction rules, transform logic, metrics, and reporting formats. In Sec-
tion 3.3.1 we discuss how implementing this pipeline as a (Python) library enables us to batch
experiments for controlled validation and analysis. Finally, we review the details of how we
have implemented the metrics catalog and some findings we have come across regarding their
presentation in the literature.
3.3.1. Processing Pipeline Instrumentation
Originally our focus was on reproducing graph based security metrics. While we have
since expanded the scope to include the range of metrics that can be applied to any area of
cyber security, the metrics which exploit the relationships between components in the system
typically require the most preprocessing to shape the inputs correctly. For instance, a count
of the number of critical vulnerabilities found from a scan is a straight forward metric calcu-
lation. Determining which vulnerabilities are reachable in a given network topology requires
more effort, and ensuring that reachability graph conforms to the assumptions of the tar-
get metric (non-invertable weighted transition matrix or some other specific representation)
requires still further computation. Thus, PTaH exposes some general statistical methods
for the simpler metrics as well as some more fine grained helpers that apply to subsets or
individual metric implementations. In this way we can maintain the simple abstractions of
both the raw input source and the actual metric calculation, while also supporting the pre-
processing requirements for new metrics. As mentioned above, there are many ETL pipeline
implementations available which would be suitable for this implementation, so in this section
we demonstrate examples of metric specific data transformations rather than the underlying
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(a) Attack graph produced by MulVal
(b) LEAFs scored & pruned (c) Merge non-exploit ANDs (d) Merge remaining ANDs
(e) Merge remaining ORs (f) Add pseudo-root (g) Calculate advance probs




Figure 3.10: Graph Weight Manipulation: These pairs should have equivalent security for
the respective target metrics.
technology used to execute them.
The attack graph models described in the literature vary somewhat in structure among
implementations. For example, the AGs presented in [299] include non-exploits along with
exploits as nodes with edges representing lateral movements. In [292] the non-exploit nodes
don’t appear to be present in the publication, although the TVA tool isn’t publicly available
to test this. In [108] and [297] nodes represent system privileges and edges contain exploits
that grant an attacker additional privileges on a set of systems, while in [315] edges carry
probabilities of exploitation and the nodes represent actual hosts. While the differences are
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subtle, they do require an understanding of the target input expected by each metric. In
these cases, our solution is to provide helper methods that transform the provided knowledge
base into any of these expected input formats. If an attack graph is needed for processing,
relevant system information is translated into datalog facts for use in MulVal[299]. MulVal
consists of 2 primary components, an XSB Datalog program that computes attack traces
from a given set of facts and interaction rules, and a C++ program that processes the XSB
output trace and produces an annotated list of vertices and edges corresponding to possible
attack paths. To allow more control over MulVal processing we replaced the driver shell script
with a python interface, allowing programmatic access to the facts and interaction rules that
are used to derive attack graphs directly over a Python-XSB bridge. This allows us to
manipulate structural properties of the input system and delegate vulnerability placement
strategically while avoiding many of the high cost disk operations that the original controller
required.
While the differences are subtle, they are enough to necessitate a general form of attack
graph which we present in Figure 3.6. Our representation of an attack graph is a multi-edged
directed acyclic graph.
In Figure 3.9, we show the process of ingesting an attack graph produced by MulVal[299]
and transforming it into a normalized weighted graph for export to a dense transition matrix
used in several probabilistic security metrics. A MulVal attack graph contains three types
of nodes. Referring to Figure 3.9a, LEAF nodes (green rectangles) describe known facts
like configuration information and attacker privilege that are given as inputs to the system
model. Internal nodes generally represent potential privileges to be gained by an attacker.
AND nodes (red ovals) contain interaction rules that dictate which facts and conditions
are necessary to derive new knowledge. OR nodes (blue diamonds) represent derived facts
such as transition states possible given all incoming conditions are satisfied. Each step in
the reduction process can be called explicitly via API to produce the desired result, or the
composition of a series of individual transforms can be exposed as a single call.
Once loaded, we provide programmatic access to manipulate scoring and weighting func-
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tions, exploit definitions, and vulnerability assignments. This allows for a simple means to
test the range of values a metric will generate, the sensitivity of a metric to fluctuations
in parameters, and how well a metric performs on different models. It also gives us some
insights into how well each AG type actually models threat and defense attributes. While
we focus on attack graphs in this paper, the process for manipulating other threat model
structures (such as attack trees or nets) is similar, where the goal is to introduce controlled
perturbations in the representation without altering its fundamental structure to assess the
behaviour of the target metric.
47 coalesce rules: # list of AND rules to coalesce
48 - 'multi-hop access by gateway'
49 - 'multi-hop access'
50 - 'direct on-host access'
51 - 'direct network access'
52 - 'log in for ftpd'
53 - 'Access a host through a log-in service'
Listing 3.6: Node Labels to Coalesce
The dictionaries shown in Listings 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 provide granular control over the
transformation process and can be defined statically at compile time via yaml syntax (shown),
or generated dynamically at runtime and set as properties of the associated object being
transformed.
The coalesce rules shown in Listing 3.6 define which types of transitions should be ignored
in the final result. If we consider an adjacency matrix M where the connections between two
vertices represent the likelihood of successful exploit, then in cases where no exploit was used,
how is the transition represented? Leaving the value at zero may result in a non-invertable
or improperly weighted result, so we simply merge any transitional edges that occur as a
result of one of the rules in this dictionary.
54 exploit rules: # dict of AND rules to add to tmatrix
55 'remote exploit of a server program': 3
56 'Trojan horse installation': 4
57 'local exploit': 5
58 'NFS shell': 7
59 'execCode implies file access': 8
60 'NFS semantics': 9
61 'any machine he has an account on will also be compromised': 9.2
62 'through a log-in service': 9.3
63 'password sniffing through spoof': 4
64 'password sniffing through route hijack': 5.6
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Listing 3.7: Fixed Scores for Exploit Classes
Similar in behavior to the coalescing rules above, we can also fix transition scores of
classes of transitions based on the interaction rule they fire. This allows us to test the effects
of changing the exploitability or impact scores on classes of vulnerabilities based on the
outcome of that successful exploit without needing to identify every possible vulnerability
that produces that outcome.










Listing 3.8: Override Specific Vulnerability Scores
Listing 3.8 allows us to fix any specific vulnerability score individually. The override
precedence favours specific over general, so individual scores set here will be applied after
scoring based on exploit rules and globally fixing scores. Finally, a default scoring strategy
which supports dataset queries such as NVD, or returning a fixed weight if preferred.
75 # from Dacier_1996
76 # .0002 is quasi-instantanious
77 # .02 is 1 hour
78 # .2 1 day
79 # 1 is 1 week
80 # 5 is one month
81 # 50 is one year
82 # we invert so scores reflect
83 # mean transition rates (lambda)
84 time_dict = {(0, 1.6): 1. / .0002,
85 (1.6, 3.3): 1. / .02,
86 ( 3.3, 5): 1. / .2,
87 (5, 6.6): 1. / 1.,
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88 (6.6, 8.3): 1. / 5.,
89 (8.3, 10): 1. / 50., }
Listing 3.9: Map CVSS to MTTF
As shown in Figures 3.10a and 3.10b, we can also map scored graphs between systems.
Listing 3.9 demonstrates how we can map an interval, in this case CVSS score ranges, to
a fixed value like the MTTF arrival rates provided by Dacier[107]. In Figure 3.10c we
apply a globally fixed CVSS score to the graph which preserves the MTTF mapping, and
subsequently remove the mapping in Figure 3.10d to return to the CVSS scoring strategy. By
instrumenting the transformation pipeline to support fine grained variations of the structures
and values passed to security metrics, we can study how these metrics perform in a variety
of scenarios, validate the metrics against a set of functional criteria, and select appropriate
security metrics based on performance against a desired reference set.
3.3.2. Security Metrics Catalog
Our architecture for implementing security metrics is straight forward. We declare a base
security metric type from which all metrics inherit three capabilities. Check Prerequisites: is
invoked either directly by the caller or in the metric’s own calculate method to ensure all items
necessary for the calculation are present. Calculate: returns the resulting measurement. Get
Metadata: returns the environment and ancillary data used during the calculation.
This design allows us to implement a library of security metrics with a standard, stateless
interface. We have been largely focused on attack graph based metrics, but tests against
metrics using other structures (eg attack nets and economic/game theoretic models) suggests
this architecture will support any type of security metric we’ve come across. Listing 3.10
shows the runtime flags available to our library implementation. Because the derived system
facts may change based on the rules asserted, after executing a test we can dump all primitive
and derived facts to a JSON structure and use that to recreate the environment that produced
a specific sample value. Because the original system is seldom referenced in attack graph
metrics, we feel this is an important requirement not only for validating existing metrics, but
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also in developing more comprehensive, robust security measurements in the future. That is
to say, there is a survivor-ship bias in attack graph based metrics, where the only systems
that produce an attack graph are necessarily vulnerable between the selected start and end
points. If a metric is exclusively operating on an attack graph for security measurement, then
we have already determined the system is insecure and exploitable, and are only estimating
the extent to which that system subgraph is resilient or susceptible given the current set of
facts and interaction rules.
90 secmet.metrics:
91 --input_model_name: use this mulval model
92 --secmet_ag_name: use this attack graph
93 --secmet_ag_path: path to find attack graphs
94 --secmet_fg_dot: fg dot file path (overrides path/name)
95 --secmet_fg_name: use this fact graph
96 --secmet_fg_path: path to find fact graphs
97 --secmet_fix_cvss_score: Applies this cvss score to all vulnerabilities.
98 (a number)
99 --secmet_map_scores: Map AG scores to another domain
100 --secmet_model_size: use exammpe models of this size
101 (default: 'small')
102 --secmet_model_type: use exaple models of this type
103 (default: 'enterprise')
104 --[no]secmet_plot_intermediate_graphs: Writes graphs to file when true.
105 (default: 'false')
106 --[no]secmet_random_cvss_score: Applies random cvss score to all
107 vulnerabilities.
108 (default: 'false')
109 --secmet_random_seed: Use this seed for randoms
110 --secmet_score_dict: use this score dictionary
111 --secmet_score_strategy: Apply this weighting and scoring strategy
Listing 3.10: SecMet CLI Flags
In order to validate a metric we can observe its behaviour over a systematically con-
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Figure 3.11: MTTF distributions over 1000 random CVSS score assignments (uniform-
dist)[108]
Figure 3.12: Fixing all vulnerability scores to determine lower and upper bounds for metric
trolled set of inputs and confirm it conforms to our predefined validation requirements. We
have proposed several validation requirements in Section 3.1.5, although these are likely not
appropriate for all metrics or use scenarios. Rather than be prescriptive about specific vali-
dation requirements, we only attempt to provide an example of how this framework can be
used to characterize the behaviour of security metrics in this work, and leave it up to system
stakeholders to determine which characteristics are desirable.
In Figure 3.11 we fix the vulnerability placement of two different input models represent-
ing a small and large enterprises, and select CVSS scores from a uniform random distribution.
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(a) Distribution of observed non-normalized
EPL
(b) Exponential Distribution of EPL scores
without normalization
Figure 3.13: Non-Normalized CVSS-weighted EPL (0-10, 0.1steps)
(a) Normalizing counters the effect of CVSS
scoring
(b) All observed values nearly identical
Figure 3.14: Normalized CVSS-weighted EPL (0-10, 0.1steps)
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We create 1000 samples in this manner and observe the distribution and kernel density esti-
mates of MTTF[109] scores for all samples. Note that Dacier uses the arrival rates shown in
Listing 3.9 to estimate the time an attacker would need to compromise each vulnerability,
and we map the randomly assigned CVSS scores to these arrival rates at uniform inter-
vals. The accumulation points observed in the small network occur at seemingly discrete
boundaries (x-axis is shown in weeks, where 0 is approximately instantaneous compromise),
while the large network demonstrates a more compressed time to compromise over all ob-
served samples, with nearly all vulnerability score distribution resulting in nearly immediate
compromise. This distribution of observed MTTF scores is confirmed in Figure 3.12 where
we maintain the same input models and vulnerability placement as shown in Figure 3.11,
but fix all CVSS scores in the range 0.0-10.0 increasing the score by 0.1 for each sample.
The resulting step-wise graph shows the boundary of each mapping interval used, but more
importantly, we can clearly observe the range of values in the small network is between 0
and 200 weeks, while the range of the larger network is restricted between 0 and 50 weeks.
This discrepancy in achievable MTTF scores means that the size of the network impacts the
range of values observed, which should be understood before selecting this measurement for
use in operational environments.
In Figures 3.14 and 3.13 we demonstrate the impact of normalization on security measure-
ment values using a procedure similar to that above. In this case we observe the Expected
Path Length[13] metric over fixed CVSS scores in the range 0.0-10.0 incrementing again by
0.1 for each sample. In Figure 3.13 we refrain from normalizing the scores used in EPL calcu-
lation and observe an exponential increase in observed values from 0 to around 12000 days as
all vulnerability scores are raised from 0.0 (easily exploited) to 10 (most difficult to exploit).
In Figure 3.14 we run the same experiment, although this time with the following normaliza-
tion method to determine the transition probability: p(i, j) =
ej∑n
k=1 ek
where n is the number
of outgoing edges from node i and ej is the CVSS exploitability score for the vulnerability
in state j. Our immediate observation is the this normalization effectively undermines the
effect of CVSS weighting, as the range of EPL values remains nearly constant after perform-
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ing this operation. We would also note here that there are several proposed security metrics
in the literature that apply some type of normalization to their transition scores with the
intent of creating stochastic models, and we are currently evaluating the effects of different
scoring and weighting strategies to the behaviour of the underlying metrics.
In figure 4.2 we demonstrate how our implementation can be used to profile metrics and
capture performance related metrics of the security metrics under evaluation. Possibly of
less concern than the behavioural analyses shown above, when we wish to compare security
metric implementations which can be either analytical (for example, the authors propose
matrix inversion in their calculation) or stochastic (where simulations are run to estimate
the same metric) then we can not only use our framework to confirm both metrics converge
on the same value, but also determine which metric does so more efficiently. We therefore
enable capturing timings related to each step in the processing pipeline, from input modeling




The number of security metrics available in the literature is somewhat overwhelming.
Surveys of security metrics from many[60, 164, 166, 209, 215, 309, 327, 342, 351, 401, 415,
419] sources and perspectives have been conducted, resulting in a multitude of taxonomies
for each declaring when and where and how a metric should be applied. What is notably
lacking from these surveys, and indeed from much of the literature reviewed, is any empirical
evaluation of the values measured by a given metric. The study of security metrics lacks the
context needed to support adoption. What we provide in this chapter is a mechanism to
establish the needed context by answering how well do these metrics perform individually
across a variety of scenarios, and how do they compare with each other for a given model.
To build context for security metrics, we break up our experiments into two parts.
The first part sizes the metric, examining how it behaves across different types and
scales of input networks. We apply the metrics implemented in Section 3.2 to a set of
models representative of different deployment scenarios. These models include enterprise
networks and core networks at scales we label small, medium, and large. The models act as
a reference set against which we can evaluate properties of the implemented metrics. Our
primary questions are how do these metrics perform as the size of the system changes, and
how do they perform in different types of systems. As our reference set grows, we can develop
an understanding of the fundamental or universal security properties we can measure, along
with the best metrics for a specific situation.
The second part ranges the metric, examining how it behaves as the security of the system
under test changes. We select a system model from our standard set and generate an attack
model for a scenario. The range of transition values in the attack model varies by metric,
but we can, in the general case, fix these values to present a minimally and maximally secure
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model with respect to the chosen metric. This bounds the security of a system to a specific
range, and measurements within this interval characterize the behaviour of the metric for a
scenario. We make observations about monotonicity and sensitivity with respect to a metric
and describe properties common across metrics.
We consider ranging and sizing as two aspects of security metric benchmarking. By
benchmarking security metrics we validate their fitness for use in general scenarios, and
create a frame of reference against which we can measure future security metrics. The rest
of this chapter describes the design, testing, and findings from this research.
4.1. Background
When system performance is described, it tends to be in quantifiable terms. The metrics
chosen are well understood characteristics like network latency and disk IOPS, the mea-
surement tools are capable of sampling the desired metrics repeatably, and the results are
reported with consistency. Benchmarks can be used to compare competing alternatives
against a desired metric, to evaluate the effect of changes made to an existing system, or
to confirm that expected service level agreements are met. It’s easy to draw a line between
system performance and return on investment.
In contrast, system security discussions can be somewhat less intuitive. Common mea-
sures include compliance level, patch cycle frequency, or the number and severity of vul-
nerability scan findings. The CVSS[262] framework provides a method to score software
vulnerabilities on metrics like impact or complexity, along with knobs to tune the base
score according to temporal or environmental factors. Scored vulnerabilities offer a ranking
method for remediation priority, but don’t give insight into the system’s overall security
posture since each vulnerability is scored in isolation.
Each vulnerability requires a set of preconditions to exist in order to perform an exploit
successfully; if an unpatched service is running but an attacker can’t connect to the listening
port due to firewall rules, then the vulnerability is not reachable. When a vulnerability
is exploited successfully, the resulting postconditions (escalated privileges for example) are
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applied to the attacker and environment, potentially opening the way to previously unreach-
able vulnerabilities. A common representation of the reachability between vulnerabilities in
a system is a directed graph, where an edge exists between two nodes when all preconditions
needed to compromise the successor are met by the predecessor. By assigning an attacker an
initial set of preconditions and a set of target postconditions as the goal, then a sequence of
nodes with edges connecting the initial position and the target forms an attack path, and the
enumeration of all possible attack paths is the attack graph. The attack graph augmented
with CVSS scores forms the basis of many of the model based security metrics described in
[309][327][415] which we briefly review in Section 2.2.
There are numerous security metrics published, but what we have encountered in practice
supports Verendel’s conclusions in [415] and Pendleton’s in [309] - that there is a lack of
validation for many of the quantitative methods described in the literature. Attack graph
based security metrics tend to be studied in isolation, with the result produced being a
mathematical derivation demonstrating analytical soundness, possibly accompanied by a
simple use-case to illustrate applicability. What is missing from these studies is a standard
methodology and data set to verify security performance against.
What we propose is a framework for measuring the relative performance of model based
security metrics. Benchmarks exist for most other aspects of computing; for network, com-
pute, and storage hardware, for machine learning, stream processing, cache serving, code
compiling, and even for other areas of security like cryptographic libraries, spam filtering,
and intrusion detection systems. Paxson [306] provides generally applicable characteristics
of good benchmarks:
• Precision is a limitation of the tool’s ability to measure beyond a certain level of detail.
• Accuracy errors are differences between the measurement we took and the actual value
of the thing we measured. Paxson’s example is tcpdump silently dropping packets,
leading to difference between measured packet count and actual packets sent.
• Misconception errors are differences in what we intended to measure and what we
actually measured. Several examples related to incorrect implementation of network
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tests (packet loss by retrans count, throughput without filling xfer size filling send
buffer)
• Calibration is used to reduce errors in accuracy and misconception - 4 strategies includ-
ing testing edge cases, consistency checks, synthetic test data, and retest with different
methods to validate.
• Metadata should be associated with each measurement - can limit precision errors and
make data re-usable
These properties must be taken into account when designing a measurement instrument
for our metric validation framework. Preventing misconceptions about what we are measur-
ing is of particular importance, as the measurement units of many security metrics are not
particularly intuitive.
PerfKit Benchmarker is an open source tool originally created at Google that allows users
to easily run benchmarks on various cloud providers without having to manually set up the
infrastructure required for those benchmarks. PerfKit Benchmarker follows the 5 step process
to automate each benchmark run. The Configuration phase processes command line flags,
configuration files, and benchmark defaults to establish the final specification used for the
run. The Provisioning phase creates the networks, subnets, firewalls and firewall rules, virtual
machines, drives, and other cloud resources required to run the test. Benchmark binaries and
dependencies like datasets are also loaded in this phase. The Execution phase is responsible
for running the benchmarks themselves, and Teardown releases any resources created during
the Provision phase. The Publishing phase packages the test results into a format suitable
for further analysis such as loading into a reporting system. The metadata returned from
the Publishing phase can include verbose details about the actual infrastructure used during
the test and timing information for each phase of the run along with the metrics returned




At a high level each attack graph based security metric follows the simplified processing
pipeline shown in Fig 3.1.
In Step 1, the inputs include host definitions, accounts and permissions, network connec-
tivity and ACLs, system policies, vulnerability definitions, etc. It is usually assumed these
parameters are collected through standard management tools and translated into a common
system model for consumption by the attack graph generation engine.
In Step 2, the system model is examined for policy violations or possible exploits that
would lead to a given target’s compromise. If a compromise is possible, an attack graph is
produced. This is the expected input for most of the metrics we have examined, although
some also assume the edges have been weighted with CVSS scores first.
The algorithm for computing the metric is run in step 3 with the attack graph as input,
and the computed result is returned in the final step.
Our first observation is that survivorship bias[420] is implicit in all AG based security
metrics. An attack graph is produced only when a system model includes in its definition
enough detail to identify possible attacks. An attack graph will not be created if a system is
totally secure. Secure and insecure systems should, in theory at least, be mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive; unfortunately, an attack graph will also not be created if a
system is totally insecure, but the system model or processing logic is incomplete. So, when
validating AG metrics, we must have accepted a priori the selection bias inherent with their
use. That is, we are not measuring if a system is secure or not; rather, we are measuring
just how insecure that system is.
With this in mind, validation can be seen as a test of how well a metric captures the
scale of insecurity which is known to be on the system under test. We propose here a simple
methodology for calibrating a metric and gauging it’s accuracy in a controlled manner.
What we assume in Algorithm 2 is that the security metric is using some weighting scheme
to influence an attacker’s selection of paths, which is common in all but the structural metrics
(more on these later) we’ve encountered. So, for CVSS base score weighted AG metrics, we
would fix all vulnerabilities at the lowest score (1 in this case) and calculate the metric, and
88
Require: Valid Attack Graph, N = # partitions
for n ∈ range (1..N) do




Algorithm 2: Calibrate Weighted Security Metric
do the same again fixing all vulnerabilities at the highest score for the scale (10 for CVSS).
This bounds the range of the metric under test. Creating more than 2 partitions of the score
range gives us insight into the behaviour of the metric for this particular attack graph. An
example of this calibration is given in 4.5.1
To turn this testing algorithm into a benchmark, we need attack graphs which repre-
sent typical deployment scenarios. By far the most common use cases in the literature are
small enterprise systems consisting of a limited number of distinct node types (web server,
database, firewall, workstation, ...) and a 2-dimensional perimeter. While these examples are
easily digestible when describing the applicability of an intensive mathematical derivation,
they fall short of validating the new metric as it would be seen in the wild. We propose a
standard benchmark set of attack graphs which isolate interesting attack patterns for study.
In this way we can target micro-benchmarks for specific properties, and integrate or compose
models for a more rounded workload examination.
Table 4.1: AG Standard Set - Target Scenarios
Enterprise MEC/MANET Core Cloud





Container/K8s 4G/5G Layer 1&2 Hypervisor
Large (1000-
2000)




We refer again to the system performance benchmarking analogy to describe the design
considerations and methodology used in the proposed security benchmarking framework.
In the performance benchmarking scenario, assume we are considering migrating from a
corporate data center to the public cloud, and we want to estimate operating cost for multiple
CSPs to base the comparison. Our strategy might begin by characterizing our data center’s
compute, network, and storage profiles and reproducing them on each of the candidate CSPs.
We can size the environments across CSPs by holding the workload parameters constant and
tuning each cloud deployment until it matches the expected baseline performance. Once we
have established comparable deployment environments between clouds, we can then run the
synthetic workload for the same duration on each provider and compare the costs incurred
directly. After migration, benchmark tests can be scheduled to ensure SLAs are met and to
inform system baseline heuristics and continuous monitoring systems.
If we re-imagine this situation in terms of security metrics, the components needed for
validation and verification begin to emerge. In this context, we are still comparing CSPs
for cost efficiency, but the constraint is now to maintain the same security posture as our
current system.
The first step above was to establish the baseline performance metrics we intend to target
on the systems under test. Obviously the target environments would be adjusted to account
for differences in requirements - network latency and throughput might deviate based on
proximity to the nearest cloud regional data center, or block storage capacity requirements
might decrease given the availability of alternate cold storage services.
Similarly, we can take a snapshot of the current security baseline by measuring any
or all security metrics for the current state. This involves generating attack graphs and
running simulations, or just interrogating the SIEM or other source of aggregated security
telemetry for the current patch levels and AV signatures. After establishing the current
baseline, we proceed with tuning the remote environments to match the baseline. This might
involve scaling instance sizes to align with compute or network objectives, while tuning
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for security could lead to rewriting boundary service ACLs to meet the baseline attack
surface target. When we tune the candidate environments to match the baseline, we are
effectively calibrating our metrics for the current evaluation. After tuning is complete,
running the synthetic workload (comprising network traffic generators, endpoint stressers,
or disk/CPU/DB/etc relevant operation mixes for example) for a fixed amount of time should
yield nearly the same results across all tuned metrics, with the exception being cost, which
is the measurement we wanted to take.
To eliminate friction with evaluation and increase likelihood of adoption we have imple-
mented our security benchmarks as an extension of the open source toolkit PerfKit Bench-
marker [314]. PKB allows users to easily run benchmarks on various cloud providers without
having to manually set up the infrastructure required for those benchmarks. PerfKit Bench-
marker follows the 5 step process shown in Figure ?? to automate each benchmark run.
The Configuration phase processes command line flags, configuration files, and benchmark
defaults to establish the final specification used for the run. The Provisioning phase creates
the networks, subnets, firewalls and firewall rules, virtual machines, drives, and other cloud
resources required to run the test. Benchmark binaries and dependencies like datasets are
also loaded in this phase. The Execution phase is responsible for running the benchmarks
themselves, and Teardown releases any resources created during the Provision phase. The
Publishing phase packages the test results into a format suitable for further analysis such
as loading into a reporting system. The metadata returned from the Publishing phase can
include verbose details about the actual infrastructure used during the test and timing in-
formation for each phase of the run along with the metrics returned from the benchmark
itself, providing the level of detail needed to understand the benchmark results in context.
4.4. Monitoring & Alerting
4.5. Results
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(a) Unnormalized EPL times (b) Normalized EPL times
Figure 4.2: Mean time in each pipeline stage
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Chapter 5
Applications of Machine Learning to Security Metrics Research
In this chapter we investigate how machine learning can be used in conjunction with the
metrics and measurements we are surfacing to improve our understanding of cyber security.
Specifically, we focus on the following 3 areas in this paper:
1. Learning valid security metrics: Can we apply graph clustering and similarity
methods to group models by valid cyber security properties?
2. Model Scoring for Network Design Support: Can we make use of existing system
and threat models, along with associated security metrics, to better model attacker
behavior and improve incident response?
3. Vulnerability Score Fuzzing to predict metric: Given a network model, can we
predict the values of specific security metrics through classification or regression?
In the December 2019 workshop Implications of Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecu-
rity [361], one of the key takeaways identified was the need to expand the connections between
cyber security and applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. In this work
we have so far focused on making cyber security measurable, focusing on instrumentation
for automation and autonomy. Programmatic access to security metrics through automation
opens up a wide variety of applications involving, and can itself be improved by, current tech-
niques in machine learning. In this chapter we describe the design details for the experiments
we are conducting using the SMaaS environment. While adversarial AI and attacks on ML
models are areas of concern today, the direction of this work is not in applying SMaaS to
evaluate the security of machine learning. Instead, we propose to investigate the use of spe-




Machine learning techniques can be broadly grouped into 4 categories based on the types
of problems they solve. Clustering problems try to find groupings in data sets by minimizing
distances from members of the same group and maximizing distances between members of
differing groups. Classification problems map new instance data onto a discrete set of values
representing categories or labels, while regression maps new data onto a continuous set of
values. Rule extraction[121] is a statistical inference method used to predict responses from
given input patterns. It is also common to describe machine learning by one of four types of
learning used. Supervised learning is provided labeled training data to build models from,
while unsupervised learning is trained on unlabeled data. Semi-supervised learning is
used with a mix of labeled and unlabeled data. Reinforcement learning[395] maximizes
values from an internal scoring functions to learn a model about the environment.
The use of machine learning techniques in cyber security is just starting to be explored.
The two surveys[68, 439] published in 2016 and 2018 review a wide range of ML and RL
methods specific to the area of intrusion detection. In [65] the authors survey the field
of networking generally for uses of machine learning. Their findings cover areas in traffic
management like routing and congestion control, as well as resource and fault management
topics. On the subject of network security, the subject areas reviewed were again narrowly
focused on intrusion detection.
In this work we describe methods for evaluating cyber security that incorporate the
underlying structure of the (computer) network under test. Graphs are a natural way to
represent network connections and the relationships between system components, but pre-
serving that structure adds complexity to the cost of analysis. Modern machine learning
techniques make use of optimizations and transformations to reduce their complexity, and
graph learning methods are no exception. Similar to preprocessing an image set to uniform
dimensions prior to training, many graph learning methods presuppose an embedding of
the graph data as input requirement. Goyal’s graph embedding survey[153] finds 4 broad
categories of these methods:
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1. Node Classification: Predict the label of a node based on its embedding.
2. Link Predicton: Predict edge based on embeddings of nodes it joins.
3. Clustering: Community detections and node groupings.
4. Visualization: Interpreting more than a few dozen nodes becomes difficult.
Graph embedding can mean either embedding the entire graph in vector space, or em-
bedding each node in vector space. The goal in either case is to encode the graph data onto
a lower dimensional space while retaining the relevant structural relationships. Common
practice is to learn graph embeddings by defining the encoding and similarity functions, and
then optimize the encoding parameters which maximize the similarity. How the similarity
distance is measured and which properties are selected for feature encoding are some of the
challenges in deciding the best embedding method[153].
In the December 2019 workshop Implications of Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecu-
rity [134], one of the key takeaways identified was the need to expand the connections between
cyber security and applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. In this work
we have so far focused on making cyber security measurable, focusing on instrumentation
for automation and autonomy. Programmatic access to security metrics through automation
opens up a wide variety of applications involving, and can itself be improved by, current tech-
niques in machine learning. In this section we describe the design details for the experiments
we are developing using the SMaaS environment. While adversarial AI and attacks on ML
models are areas of concern today, the direction of this work is not in applying SMaaS to
evaluate the security of machine learning. Instead, we propose to investigate the use of spe-
cific machine learning techniques to improve cyber security through the metrics framework
we developed above.
Machine learning techniques can be described by the 4 key types of of problems they
solve. Clustering problems try to find groupings in data sets by minimizing distances from
members of the same group and maximizing distances between members of differing groups.
Classification problems map new instance data onto a discrete set of values representing
categories or labels, while regression maps new data onto a continuous set of values. Rule
96
extraction[121] is a statistical inference method used to predict responses from given input
patterns.
It is also common to describe machine learning by one of four types of learning used.
Supervised learning is provided labeled training data to build models from, while unsu-
pervised learning is trained on unlabeled data. Semi-supervised learning is used with a
mix of labeled and unlabeled data. Reinforcement learning[395] maximizes values from an
internal scoring functions to learn a model about the environment.
Machine learning is a fast moving research area. We consult the 2019 Deep Learning in
Mobile and Wireless Networking: A Survey, [457], 2018 A comprehensive survey on machine
learning for networking [65], and the 2018 Machine Learning and Deep Learning Methods for
Cybersecurity [439] to identify current techniques and canonical literature for our topic.
MulVal Facts : Datalog facts defining system model: (Hosts, Policies, Principals, Vulner-
abilities, Interaction Rules) + (Attacker Location, Goal) MulVal Output: DAG of possible
paths attacker can reach goal (nxn connectivity matrix)
5.2. Security Metric Prediction
Problem Type: Classification and Regression problem.
There are quite a few scenarios that can be described as ‘Metric Prediction’. In general
we approach these as supervised categorical classification or regression tasks, where SMaaS
is used to create a labeled dataset of network models or attack graphs with the resulting
security metric(s). Training and validation proceed as usual, with the resulting model able
to predict the metric of new network states or topologies without needing the SMaaS system.
1a. Vulnerability Score Perturbation to predict metric
Goal: Given a weighted transition matrix −→ predict specific metric
Method: Fuzz vulnerability weights (won’t affect AG structure)
• Find best fit function (LR, . . . )
• Compare time/perf over simulation for small/med/large matrixes
• Compare performance for different metrics (within/outside same class)
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Figure 5.1: Learning Metrics from Vulnerability Score
• Fuzz subset of vulns for PCA or confuse
1b. Vulnerability Placement Fuzzing
Figure 5.2: Learning Metrics from Vulnerability Placement
Goal: Given a MulVal model −→ predict specific metric
Method: Fuzz vulnerability placements (will affect AG structure)
• Can we learn if an AG will be produced (connectedness)?
• Can we predict any metrics?
• Might be a good application for GNNs
• Could either learn on tmatrix (easy) or MulVal model (harder)
1c. Network Model Fuzzing
Goal: Given a MulVal model −→ predict specific metric
Method: Fuzz network facts (will affect AG structure)
• Can we learn if an AG will be produced (connectedness)?
• Can we learn how to make a valid Network model?
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Figure 5.3: Learning Metrics from Network Topology
• Prolog syntax/token understanding needed
5.3. Model Enhancements
The reliability of a measurement depends on the reliability of the input. Garbage in,
garbage out is especially true for model based calculations. In Section 3.2.1 we discussed
the role interaction rules play in defining the possible attacks against a system, and that a
model missing relevant interaction rules will falsely report no possible attacks when, in fact,
they do exist.
In order to ensure complete coverage of IRs for the domains we model, we need to
have these rules defined systematically. A good starting point is MITRE’s CAPEC[100],
the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification dataset. While this corpus
includes primarily application type attacks, another dataset, CyBOX (recently moved into
STIX), includes attack patterns observable at lower layers like infrastructure and physical
such as those we defined in Section 3.2.1. Recall from Section 2.1 that an interaction rule
can be represented as a Horn Clause of the form A←− B1, B2, . . . , Bn, where B1, B2, . . . , Bn
are facts defining preconditions that must be true to assert A is true. Both CAPEC and
CyBOX include preconditions with each attack pattern, but sadly they chose to make this
field free text and not categorical. Noel in [289] describes text mining techniques for many
scenarios but prerequisite enumeration is not one of them.
This attack requires the following:
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1. The application uses environment variables.
2. An environment variable exposed to the user is vulnerable to a buffer overflow.
3. The vulnerable environment variable uses untrusted data.
4. Tainted data used in the environment variables is not properly validated.
The example above lists the CAPEC preconditions for the authentication abuse, ID:114
attack pattern. There are currently 517 unique attack patterns, along with associated pre-
requisites and consequences, which capture post conditions like privileges gained from a
successful attack. Our goal in this work is to expand the knowledge base for threat model
generation to more accurately represent known patterns, and to accommodate future pat-
terns as they become known.
5.3.1. Interaction Rule Mining
Problem Type: Association Rule Learning
Figure 5.4: Association Rule Learning
Goal: Given a Network model −→ learn vulnerability rules and conditions
• Need fine grained data (ports/protocols/services/versions)
• Can we learn conditions for existing exploits?
• Can we learn conditions for new exploits?
• Output needs to comply with datalog AST (need ANTL/Thrift here maybe)
At the heart of MulVal is the interaction rule, which describes how each the set of facts
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combine to derive new information about the system. These derived facts then describe how
attackers can advance through the system towards a target. Developing interaction rules is
currently an artistic endeavor undertaken by a subject matter expert. . . that is to say, it is
error prone, and MulVal includes around 30 interaction rules to derive the following 8 facts:
1 derived(accessFile(_machine,_access,_filepath)).




6 derived(logInService(_host, _protocol, _port)).
7 derived(netAccess(_machine,_protocol,_port)).
8 derived(principalCompromised(_victim)).
Listing 5.1: Mulval Derived Facts
As we have demonstrated previously, the existing MulVal model leaves large gaps in defining
the entire attack surface of a network. To begin covering the possible IR set it will be
necessary to automate the rule generation process.
• Map existing actively maintained taxonomies like MITRE’s CAPEC (common attack
patterns), STIX (structured threat information), or MAEC (malware attribute enu-
merations) to an ontology of simple subject-verb-object relations.
• Translate this ontology into DataLog Horne clauses
• Translate the populated taxonomy information to DataLog Facts
• Use these IR rules to seed the next phase of ML or RL based rule learners and rule
refiners [273, 159]
• Evaluate the efficacy of the ML rule learners by comparing to established attack pat-
terns (withhold a subset of MITRE rules for testing, validate new rules not in test set
through penetration test)
5.3.2. Agent Based IR Learning
Problem Type: Reinforcement Learning
101
Goal: Demonstrate the feasibility of using RL to model attacks. Further, identify if and
when security metrics are appropriate to incorporate into the environment responses, agent
value function, or agent policy to model attacker or defender behaviour.
Reinforcement learning[395] is a computational method of building an optimal set of
interactions between an agent and its environment to achieve a specific goal. A policy
defines the agent’s behaviour for a given environment state. A reward signal defines the goal
as a single reward value returned at each time step. A value function is used to predict the
maximum reward available to the agent in the given environment. Environment state can be
described using a Markov decision process similar to how we have already modeled attacker
state in some of our metrics.
Model-free RL can be thought of as trial and error based learning, where the agent doesn’t
need to understand how its actions affect the environment. In model-free RL, Q-learning is
the most well studied and widely used method[65].
Model-based RL allows an agent to make inferences about how the environment will
behave by planning how possible actions will change the environment’s state. The simple
tic-tac-toe example given by [395] uses the 3x3 board as a model which can be used by an
agent to anticipate the results of potential moves and plan for an optimal strategy against
an opponent.
In our case, we already have two distinct models for this type of reinforcement learn-
ing. The first model is the ’normal use’ transition matrix of the system model that shows
connectivity between elements given as a set of user and system principals and permissions,
network ports and protocols, and access control lists. The second model is the transition
matrix of the exploitable paths in the resulting attack graph.
5.4. Methodology
As discussed in the literature review, the majority of machine learning applications in
the cyber security realm have been focused on intrusion detection techniques. Rather than
revisit those efforts, through our previous work we are in a unique position to take advantage
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of existing measures of security to assist in training and optimization of machine learning
algorithms. While there are many security metrics in the literature, we focus primarily
on those that already rely on attack graphs to calculate a metric. Pendleton’s survey[309]
focuses on metrics that quantify attack and defense interactions, and these are the broadly
descriptive measurements that would provide the most benefit to operators in the field.
These metrics are classified as measuring one or more of Vulnerabilities, Threats, Defenses,
or Situations. Situations in this case is a comprehensive metric, with Pendleton’s example
subgroups measuring security state over time, successful attacks over time (incident rate),
and return on economic investment. Again we find a subjectivity in the assignment of
users’ susceptibility and attack and defense effectiveness scores. Even CVSS is bound to
variance for any vulnerabilities not pre assigned a score. In comparison, analogous system
wide performance metrics like those found in workload simulations (YCSB for example) will
be fairly deterministic. Verendel[415] makes a critical analysis of the claim that security is
quantifiable. The premise is that most of the published models and metrics that attempt
to measure security lack the scientific rigor to corroborate or validate their hypothesis. The
scope of is limited to operational security measurements and assumes measurement primitives
include systems, threats, and vulnerabilities.
Our methodology then is to explore areas of machine learning that have have not yet
been available to the cyber security community. To this end, we have a variety of options
available, not all of which will be productive. Our first approach is to label a set of system
models with the value assigned by respective security metrics. In this way we create a
labeled training set that can be used to train a model which avoids the expensive overhead
of evaluating metrics continuously through analytical methods. Given the nature of many
stochastic metrics, there is also a great potential for applying unsupervised learning methods
to our data set, which we will also describe in the next sections.
5.4.1. Data Generation and Representation
Recall that Boromir drives the security metric benchmarking process and manages sample
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persistence. The following command generate 1000 samples of the standard set metrics for
the default models defined in the environment. Setting random scores is optional, but makes
non-stochastic measurements a little more interesting.
> ./run_boromir.py --boromir_run_count=1000 --secmet_random_cvss_scores
When a test run kicks off, Boromir relays the user inputs and security metric specifications
to PTAH to provision the system models which will be used for the test.
All facts used to build the models are conveniently collocated in XSB with the MulVal[299]
attack graph engine. This allows us to solicit interaction rules from users or other processes
while the models are being assembled. When a run is over, the fact base is dumped from XSB
and packaged with the test’s metadata, so every sample contains the information needed to
recreate the environment it was taken from.
<class 'pandas.core.frame.DataFrame'>
RangeIndex: 1000 entries, 0 to 999
Data columns (total 5 columns):
sample_uri 1000 non-null object
reduced_ag 1000 non-null object
orig_ag 1000 non-null object
fact_graph 1000 non-null object
value 1000 non-null float64
dtypes: float64(1), object(4)
memory usage: 39.2+ KB
Listing 5.4.1 shows a dataframe holding 1000 samples from a boromir run. The sample uri
field is a unique uuid for each row, and value is the result of the metric calculation. The
remaining three fields hold the fact graph, the attack graph, and the adjacency matrix
equivalent subgraph of the attack graph. We describe the reduction processes provided by
this framework in Section 3.2.3, so here we simply refer to the networkx inherited function
to dump the graph as a sparse matrix.
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5.4.2. Preperation for Standard ML Pipelines
sample_uri w_0_0 w_0_1 w_0_2 w_0_3 w_0_4
0 f3c1b87e-cad1-431f-ac63-eac72b694c84 0.0 5.49 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 0514df06-4242-451a-b737-41057c26dc00 0.0 7.74 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 a6c94818-2807-484a-83c5-d2f227a37a45 0.0 6.21 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 8b265a5c-f662-42fd-a8a1-f084ef4a66e1 0.0 2.05 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 9dc8f994-84a6-40d4-ae6d-bf1cfdba007d 0.0 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
w_0_5 w_1_0 w_1_1 w_1_2 {\ldots} w_4_3 w_4_4 w_4_5 w_5_0 w_5_1 w_5_2
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.81 {\ldots} 0.0 0.0 5.07 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.21 {\ldots} 0.0 0.0 6.43 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.85 {\ldots} 0.0 0.0 8.10 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.71 {\ldots} 0.0 0.0 4.82 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.67 {\ldots} 0.0 0.0 7.84 0.0 0.0 0.0
w_5_3 w_5_4 w_5_5 score
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.00
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.00
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.00
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.75
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.50
[5 rows x 38 columns]
5.5. Results
In Figure 5.5 we show the error rates where 5.5l is the histgram of securty values dis-
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tributed over the label space.
For a graph G = (V,E), a node embedding function f : u→ Rn maps each node u ∈ G
onto a d dimensional set of real values called a feature vector. For any two nodes u, v ∈ G,
a similarity function sim(u, v) measures the strength of the relationship between the two
nodes. Because nodes can be related in many different ways, there are multiple ways to
measure similarity. The proximity of the encoded nodes in the embedding space reflects the
similarity of the nodes in the original graph. Current embedding approaches include matrix




In the literature we reviewed there were over 500 distinct security metrics identified.
The surveys each provided their own classification systems which were appropriate for the
analysis they conducted, but none of these taxonomies generalize well to classify all types
of security metrics. We describe properties common to all metrics, identify overlaps in the
various taxonomies, identify points of confusion between existing metric hierarchies, and
describe a suitable and intuitive system for classifying any current or future security metric.
In using the CyBOK as the underlying classification system we are also able to determine
the distribution of metrics in each topic and identify areas of limited coverage which would
benefit from future research.
In reproducing the results from the literature, we faced several issues during implemen-
tation, particularly with model based security metrics. Often assumptions were made about
the intermediate processing of the pipeline that weren’t surfaced in the supporting examples
of the publication. We note that many of the survey authors describe security metric valida-
tion as an area of concern in security metric research. In response to these concerns and to
move forward in our own research, we identified a generalized four step processing pipeline
that separates the core steps of this process. By following this workflow we have identified
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k) (l)
(m) (n) (o) (p)
Figure 5.5: Classifier Error Plots (Predicted vs Actual) for the system’s calculated security
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Figure 5.6: Histograms of observed value distributions for each feature
and implemented many reusable preprocessing components, allowing us to rapidly add new
security metrics from the literature and immediately test the performance of those metrics
against a growing number of input models we use as our reference set.
By enforcing the 4 stage pipeline abstraction, we achieve several benefits. Each phase is
modular so that replacing any piece in the pipeline is straight forward. By plugging in the
static reference set to the input phase we create a unit test of sorts for our metric library,
SecMet. With PTaH, the preprocessing and transformation handlers described above, we
can articulate how any or all of the security metrics will behave under a variety of conditions
for any given input - not just the reference set we describe above. This, in theory at least,
should make characterizing the behaviours of security metrics on internal or sensitive systems
as simple as adding input adapters to the existing set, which already includes Nessus, OVAL,
NVD, CVE, and now SSFNet. By replacing our validation PTaH with whatever workflow
execution engine is already in place, Apache Beam or Storm for example, the SecMet catalog
becomes a drop in security measurement aid to support SecDevOps which we refer to as
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Security Metrics as a Service (S-MaaS).
Our takeaways from the experiments described above indicate that, while validating
security metrics is not done rigorously in many of the publications, a mechanism for validation
and analysis is not out of reach. By streamlining the development and evaluation process
with automation, we aim to lower the barrier to entry in the field and allow researchers to
spend more time developing and analyzing security metrics, which in turn should encourage




6.1. Carrier Network Migration
We consider the use case of a network operator migrating core infrastructure from tradi-
tional switching and routing elements to a centrally managed SDN architecture. We assume




(b) Transition (c) Future
Figure 6.1: Network migration models from current to future
The primary network elements we consider for this analysis are Customer Edge (CE)
routers, Provider Edge (PE) routers, and Provider Core (P) routers. CE routers attach
to PE routers and communicate information about the customer network topology to the
provider. PE routers exchange routing information with other PE routers about the net-
works they are attached to. PE routers also learn from P routers what paths are available
through the provider network. Once routing and signalling information is established, the
PE and P routers can forward customer traffic through the provider network. In conven-
tional networks routing and signalling information is exchanged directly between adjacent
routers, whereas the controller receives this information in SDN architectures. To determine
110
the correct path through the network, routers and switches are required to parse frame and
packet headers to identify the source and destination of incoming traffic. Multi Protocol Label
Switching (MPLS)[37] is used to reduce the overhead of packet processing and isolate cus-
tomer traffic by applying labels on incoming packets. Labels speed up routing through core
and transit networks by reducing the effort needed to process the header at each hop. We
have reduced the scale and scope of the network models to capture some of the key changes
in the architectures during migration while reducing overall complexity. These representa-
tive models allow us to isolate the impact of specific architecture changes on the system’s
security.
The current network model depicted in Figure 6.1a captures the existing architecture
elements such as distributed routing protocols and hardware and operating system level
components. When customer traffic enters the Ingress Router PE1 from the customer edge
CE1, access control lists are enforced to drop any packets with a destination address matching
the address of the core infrastructure. Traffic flows that are not denied by the ACL are then
routed through the MPLS core and forwarded to the appropriate Egress Router. In practice,
the number of ACL rules maintained on each Ingress Router could exceed 100,000 entries.
The transition state network in Figure 6.1b retains the same logical connectivity as the
current network by leveraging ACLs to restrict customer traffic. This model introduces a
global SDN controller along with the supporting infrastructure to facilitate a centrally man-
aged SDN environment. Proprietary switching hardware has been replaced by merchant sili-
con and the vendor specific applications that control the hardware have been abstracted and
moved onto the hypervisor. The result is that, while ACLs can now be centrally managed,
the attack surface of the network has increased with the addition of the SDN components.
The final network model in Figure 6.1c assumes the same underlying infrastructure as
the transitional SDN model in 6.1b but places the user traffic bound for the internet in an
MPLS VPN tunnel[281][336] instead of the default global routing context. This allows us to
study the overall effect on security of isolating the customer traffic flows and preventing the
core elements from being directly addressable.
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Table 6.1: Network Elements
Device Version Function
Cisco 12000 series IOS 12.0(32)S11v Provider Edge
Cisco ASR9000 series IOS XR Version 4.3.1 Provider Edge
Cisco CRS1 IOS XR Version 4.3.3 Provider Edge
Juniper T-series Junos 12.3R3-S4.10 Provider Edge
Cisco CRS1 IOS XR Version 4.2.4 Core
Juniper M320 Junos 13.2R2-S5.2 Route Reflector
Merchant Silicon switches, routers, OLTs Open Network Linux Fabric
SDN Controller (local) Juniper Contrail SDN
SDN Controller (global) ECOMP SDN
SDN Controller OS Ubuntu 14.04 Application Host
Network Function Virtualization Host RHEV 2.2/ KVM 83 Hypervisor (PE/P/RR/TE)
Merchant Silicon switches, routers, OLTs Open Network Linux Fabric
Some information describing the components of the three architectures is given in Table
6.1, while the ports, protocols, and services listing in Table 6.2 provides details on current
and target state network services. How services are accessed across boundaries, what vulner-
abilities are present, and how data flow shifts when moving from decentralized to centralized
control are the key elements in this analysis. These details are translated into the MulVal
input model described in Section 3.
6.1.2. Vulnerabilities
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System[262] (CVSS) is an open framework used
throughout government and industry to report the severity of specific security vulnerabili-
ties. CVSS scores range from 0 to 10 based on the vulnerability’s exploitability and impact,
with a score of 10 signifying the highest severity. Exploitability is calculated by determining
the access vector, access complexity, and number of authentication attempts required to
exploit the vulnerability, with higher exploitability values equating to an easier compromise.
Impact scores are determined by identifying the scope of a successful exploit on the vulner-
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Table 6.2: Ports, Protocols, and Services
Protocol Port Service Boundary
IGP - OSPF P
TCP 179 BGP PE↔ PE, PE↔ CE
TCP/UDP 363,1698,1699 RSVP P





IGP - OSPF P ↔ SDN local
TCP/UDP 646 LDP P ↔ SDN local
TCP 179 BGP PE↔ CE and P/PE↔ SDN local
TCP/UDP 363,1698,1699 RSVP P ↔ SDN local






TCP 6633 OpenFlow SDN Global ↔ SDN local
able system’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CVSS scores used in this research
were queried using a local copy of the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) synchronized
via MulVal’s built-in mechanism and augmented with scores provided by vendors when an
official Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) designation was not available.
MulVal was originally designed with enterprise network security in scope, but recent
research[17, 40, 168] has provided extensions that allow for modelling of individual network
infrastructure attacks. In 2019 [384] presented a coherent set of facts and rules for modeling
Layer 1-3 attacks in communication networks which provides the needed semantics to define
the threats posed in Table 2.1.
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The network vulnerabilities listed in Table 6.3 have been identified to represent the types
of attacks within the scope of this project. Our intent is to identify which types of attacks
are mitigated by moving to SDN and what unplanned attacks are introduced. To aid in
this analysis we add potential vulnerabilities (eg, ACL misconfigurations, 0-days, negligent
admins, etc. . . ) by assigning a theoretical CVSS score to the vulnerability and adding it to
the network model.
Table 6.3: Vulnerabilities
CVE ID Vulnerability Description Affected Hosts
CVE-2012-1342 ACL Bypass (privilege escalation) IOS 12.0
CVE-2011-4012 ACL Bypass (privilege escalation) IOS 12.0
CVE-2011-2395 Bypass (privilege escalation) IOS 12.0
CVE-2010-4685 Bypass (privilege escalation) IOS 12.0
CVE-2007-5381 BoF (remote code execution) IOS 12.0
CVE-2007-4295 Malformed Packet (remote code execution) IOS 12.0
CVE-2015-0694 NACL Bypass (privilege escalation) IOS XR
CVE-2014-3396 ACL Bypass (privilege escalation) IOS XR
CVE-2013-3464 BoF (remote code execution) IOS XR
CVE-2013-1234 BoF/DoS (remote code execution) IOS XR
CVE-2014-6379 RADIUS Bypass (privilege escalation) JunOS
CVE-2014-3818 BoF (remote code execution) JunOS
CVE-2014-3816 (privilege escalation -\textgreater authenticated user) JunOS
CVE-2013-6618 Remote code execution JunOS
CVE-2015-7501 ODL remote code execution OpenDaylight
CVE-2015-4000 ODL MitM (priv escalation/remote code exec) OpenDaylight
CVE-2015-1778 ODL Auth Bypass (priv esc/remote code exec) OpenDaylight
USN-2949-1
use-after-free vulnerability in the Linuxkernels
CXGB3 driver(DoS, remote code execution)
Ubuntu 14.0.4
CVE-2014-9769 PCRE regex (DoS, remote code execution) Ubuntu 14.0.4
CVE-2010-2784 RHEV/KVM local priv escalation, DoS RHEV 2.2/KVM 83
CVE-2014-6271/7169 DoS/remote code execution (ShellShock) Bash 4.3
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After reviewing known CVE’s to identify attack vectors, we apply hypothetical vulnera-
bilities to the proposed networks which affect the newly introduced architecture components.
Table 6.4 lists examples which would reflect the threats identified during migration.
In addition to network resources and connectivity attributes, vulnerability data is also
assigned to each host. Vulnerability information has the form vulProperty(vulnID, ac-
cessType, effect) and can be assigned to one or more hosts vulExists(host, vulnID,
program), where services running on a host are defined as networkService(host, pro-
gram, protocol, port, userPriv)
Example vulnerability definitions for the network elements listed can be found in Table
6.4. For this analysis we assigned the same vulnerabilities to the Transition and Final State
network elements and only altered the connections between hosts and the related protocols as
specified in the PPS listings above. Within our preliminary experiment parameters the result
was that no attack path could be found between the attacker and the target. While this finding
is in itself interesting, to facilitate analysis we have introduced theoretical vulnerabilities into
the Current, Transition, and Final network models as described below to demonstrate the
end-to-end CSAF flow.
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Table 6.4: Hypothetical Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability
Class
Examples Possible Effect ExploitabilityImpact
ACL
Bypass
Misconfigured ACLs on PE de-
vices could allow an attacker to






BoF Crafted ICMP packets could ex-





BoF PEVRF buffers could be ex-
hausted if client route tables are






BoF PEVRF buffers could be ex-
hausted if client route tables are





MitM Improper label assignment on





BoF PEVRF buffers could be ex-
hausted or malformed CE route






MitM SouthboundAPI calls can be in-
tercepted, mangled, forged, or
replayed noSSL/TLS
Privilege Escalation Hi Medium
RemoteCode
Execution
Commodity HW/OS remote ex-






The results in this section demonstrate how comparison between architectures can be
accomplished empirically using the security metrics presented in Section 2. Initial param-
eters did not produce attack graphs for the final state model. The implication is that this
architecture was ’secure’ given the identified vulnerabilities, attacker origin, and target.
To continue our analysis we conducted ’what-if’ testing by introducing hypothetical vul-
nerabilities into the models to represent as yet unknown attacks against specific infrastruc-
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ture services and devices. Testing automation allowed us to run and collect results from 20
competing models during this stage of the analysis.
6.1.3.1. Structural Metrics
Our findings from the structural algorithms for the three network models under test can
be found in Table 6.5. The shortest path metric is a measure of the path of least resistance
from an attacker’s origin to the target, and can be considered a priority when identifying
risk in a network.
Table 6.5: Structural Metric Results Summary
Structural Path Metric Current Transition Final
Shortest Path (SP) 4 3 3
Number of Paths (NP) 6 3 1
Mean Path Length (MPL) 5.33 4 3
Node Ranking (NR):
(a) current (b) transition
(c) final





Figure 6.3: Node Rank Analysis
6.1.3.2. Expected Path Length
Expected Path Length (EPL):
EPL describes how long we can expect an attacker to be in our network before the target
is successfully compromised. Table 6.6 shows the EPL values for each model along with the
path length histogram of the simulations that were run. This histogram counts how many
times the simulation reached the target in exactly Path Length steps. We can infer that the
higher the EPL value, the longer an attacker will attempt to advance to the target, and the
more chance we have to observe and act in response [1]. The long tail on the final state
histogram indicates that, in several simulations, the observed path length nearly tripled that
of the other two models. We notice that, despite having significantly more available attack
paths (NP(current)=6 vs NP(SDN)=3) the expected path length of the current model is
actually higher than that of the SDN model. Likewise, although the SDN models both have
Shortest Path scores = 3, we have shown the resiliency of these networks to be unequal.
In doing so we demonstrate the additional insight provided by incorporating vulnerability
awareness into our threat modelling and planning tools.
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Table 6.6: Expected Path Length Results
Current Transition Final
Expected Length: 9.398 Expected Length: 8.0875 Expected Length: 11.1405
6.1.3.3. Probabilistic Path
Probabilistic Path (PP):
Figure 6.4: Transition diagram with additional absorbing states New Target
In the current scenario calculating this PP metric results in a column of 1’s since we only
define a single ‘Target’ node in each of our models with 100% chance of absorption from any
transient node by definition.
119
However it is easy to imagine a case where multiple targets are specified in the model. For
example, we have added a second absorbing state, ‘New Target’ to the transition diagram
from Figure 2.30. This could represent a hot failover clone of the existing Target or it could
be a completely separate system with unique vulnerabilities. In either case we can make a
grounded prediction on which state will absorb the attacker with the highest likelihood and
prepare accordingly.
6.1.4. Conclusions
In this case study we provided an end-to-end scenario demonstrating the application of
the Cyber Security Analytics Framework to network migration planning. In this scenario
we created distinct network models to represent point-in-time snapshots of the migration
to an SDN controlled core network. The first model distills the existing architecture into
a reduced set of interconnected network elements comprised of the types of services and
protocols in use today. The second model modifies the first by introducing centralized SDN
control and supporting infrastructure while maintaining the logical topology and control
plane services of the current architecture. Specifically, we maintain large ingress ACLs
on both networks to prevent unauthorized traffic from reaching core infrastructure. The
final network model represents the same SDN network infrastructure while implementing
an MPLS overlay to isolate publicly addressable core infrastructure nodes from internet or
customer edge originating attacks.
We developed a modular, automated implementation of the CSAF that is instrumented
for customization. To streamline further research in this area, the following contributions
were made:
• Infrastructure setup, provisioning, analysis, and reporting are implemented using in-
dustry standard open source tools, allowing testing to run locally or on the cloud with
a single command.
• Multiple end-to-end tests can be run in sequence or parallel as dictated by available
resources.
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• Multiple network models can be specified for a test run while remaining logically or-
ganized and version controlled.
• Multiple custom rules sets can be applied individually or grouped to a test run, allowing
results to reflect the subset of rules relevant to the analysis.
• Vulnerabilities can now be weighted individually, by class, or by effect to facilitate
’what-if’ analysis. In this context it is feasible to run a battery of tests against the
provided architecture models in which vulnerabilities are applied stochastically and
the security metrics are returned as heuristics.
• Transition matrix weighting strategies have been parameterized, allowing optimization
or comparison of results.
• Metrics are extensible, customizable, and currently supported in R and Python.
During the course of this project we came across some questions that are currently being
investigated.
When a network model prevents an attacker from reaching the goal, either because the
model is truly secure or because no relevant vulnerability is defined in the rules or applied
to the system, then no attack paths exist and subsequently no further analysis is conducted.
When this occurred in our scenario above, the outcome was noted, and hypothetical vul-
nerabilities were introduced to applicable models to allow comparison. In a non-planning
(i.e., operational) environment, there must be a mechanism to delineate the true positive
null results indicating an unreachable target from the false positive null results caused by
a limited rule set. We are encouraged by the work presented in [384] as a means to bound
this problem to the OSI layer. However, after working with our own network infrastructure
attack rules and with those published by the research community, it became clear that NVD
entries don’t always provide the information necessary to determine that an infrastructure
attack is possible, or if it exists at all. While we can encode the conditions necessary to,
for example, spoof an ARP response within a subnet, we are left without vetted CVSS ex-
ploitability and impact measures if the exploit isn’t tied to a specific piece of software. In this
work we provide the user a mechanism to define these scores for a general vulnerability class
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or for a single instance of that vulnerability, so using the CVSS calculator with a knowledge
of the system under test should yield reasonable estimates. As part of ongoing research we
also allow for custom weighting strategies for cases where CVSS is not applicable.
The use of attack graphs to capture relationships between vulnerabilities, both real and
hypothetical, goes beyond looking at vulnerability data in isolation to provide a powerful





7.1. Conclusions & Future Work
System security metrics are valuable only if they can produce timely, actionable measure-
ments. In this thesis we have demonstrated a path forward for developing, testing, validating,
and integrating security metrics into the full life cycle of a system.
In Chapter 2 we present the current state of security metrics. We list the working tax-
onomies that these metrics can be categorized by, and elaborate on the distinctions that lead
to confusion when discussing security measurements. We then review modeling techniques
and how these models can isolate the security properties of a system we intend to measure.
Chapter 3 presents our unified framework for security measurement and analysis, includ-
ing the model for implementing individual metrics and the infrastructure built around these
metrics to drive automation in a variety of scenarios. Here we establish the security met-
ric inheritance hierarchy and enumerate properties common to all metric types and those
specific to each metric subtype. We provide our extensions to attack models that expand
the range of systems that can be represented. We describe how we implemented automa-
tion from the view points of a security researcher or measurement analyst, and develop our
concept of security metrics as a service, S-MaaS, with considerations for deployment in a
continuous integration or stream processing environment.
By enforcing the 4 stage pipeline abstraction, we achieve several benefits. Each phase is
modular so that replacing any piece in the pipeline is straight forward. By plugging in the
static reference set to the input phase we create a unit test of sorts for our metric library,
SecMet. With PTaH, the preprocessing and transformation handlers described above, we
can articulate how any or all of the security metrics will behave under a variety of conditions
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for any given input - not just the reference set we describe above. This, in theory at least,
should make characterizing the behaviours of security metrics on internal or sensitive systems
as simple as adding input adapters to the existing set, which already includes Nessus, OVAL,
NVD, CVE, and now SSFNet. By replacing our validation PTaH with whatever workflow
execution engine is already in place, Apache Beam or Storm for example, the SecMet catalog
becomes a drop in security measurement aid to support SecDevOps which we refer to as
Security Metrics as a Service (S-MaaS).
Our takeaways from the experiments described above indicate that, while validating
security metrics is not done rigorously in many of the publications, a mechanism for validation
and analysis is not out of reach. We covered several scenarios of systematic security metric
evaluation, but there are far more examples which we were unable to address here. By
streamlining the development and evaluation process with automation, we aim to lower
the barrier to entry in the field and allow researchers to spend more time developing and
analyzing security metrics, which in turn should result in more secure systems being deployed.
Chapter 4 develops our solution to the lack of validation in the field of security metrics.
We establish a set of validation criteria that are needed for acceptance of any metric. We
define a fixed set of models that set a frame of reference for evaluating security metrics, and
explain how these models can be used to isolate key properties of interest. We investigate
the instrumentation needed to validate our metrics in a general manner, and implement this
validation framework as extensions to an industry accepted benchmarking tool to maximize
the audience and reduce friction to entry. Finally we demonstrate our enhancements built
around benchmarking to automate the process of executing tests, analyzing results, and
alerting on anomalies and outliers that are uncovered during large scale or long running
tests.
Chapter 6 presents a case study conducted as part of AT&T’s planning for infrastructure
migration. The study applies the CSAF[10] pipeline to hypothetical network architectures
and gives insight into how model based security metrics can be used to rank an analysis of
competing alternatives. As this study occurred early in the research phase, it had a great
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impact on the direction this thesis has taken. With the benefit of hindsight we are able to
demonstrate both the contributions made during that initial work as well as the progress
that has been made since it was completed.
Figure 7.1: General Progression and Direction of Thesis
Figure 7.1 captures with broad strokes the path our research has followed and the di-
rection it is heading, while the timeline in Figure 7.2 summarizes previous research items
that support this thesis. Listed along the top are the two long running projects that have
provided both requirements and solutions in this work. SDN Migration Analytics is the focus
of the case study in Chapter 6 while the Cloud Benchmarking research has provided an in
depth knowledge of designing and validating cyber measurement instruments. Immediately
below the long running projects are short term studies conducted over summers each year.
The Tactical Edge work that bookends the summer research items focused on evaluating
the security of non traditional network architectures and drove our requirement to validate
metrics outside of the enterprise domains commonly found in the literature. The Maru re-
search over the summer of 2017 and 2018 led to the development of a distributed streaming
analytics system run from within a hardware trusted enclave, which forms the basis of the
S-MaaS architecture described in ??. On the right side a legend designates presentations,
posters, and papers delivered that relate to the research topics listed above.
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Figure 7.2: Timeline of Work Supporting Thesis
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Operational Security: Models and Tools. Information Systems Security, ed. by SK
Katsikas and D. Gritzalis, London, Chapman & Hall (1996). Citation Key:
dacier1996b tex.citation-number: 71, 23.
138
[110] Dagon, D., Zou, C., and Lee, W. Modeling botnet propagation using time zones.
In: Proc. NDSS’06.Google Scholar. Citation Key: dagon2006a. 2006.
[111] Dagon, D., et al. A taxonomy of botnet structures. In: Proc. ACSAC’07.
325–339.Google Scholar. Citation Key: dagon2007a. 2007.
[112] Dai, H., et al. Adversarial Attack on Graph Structured Data. arXiv:1806.02371
[cs, stat] (June 2018). arXiv: 1806.02371. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/1806.02371.
[113] Dalvi, N., et al. Adversarial classification. In: Proc. Vol. KDD’04. Citation Key:
dalvi2004a. 2004, 99–108.
[114] Dantu, R., and Kolan, P. Risk Management Using Behavior Based Bayesian
Networks. Citation Key: dantu2005a tex.citation-number: 110. Springer, 2005.
[115] Dantu, R., Kolan, P., and Cangussu, J. Network risk management using attacker
profiling. Security and Communication Networks 2, 1 (Jan. 2009). Citation Key:
dantu2009a tex.citation-number: 109, 83–96.
[116] Dantu, R., Loper, K., and Kolan, P. Risk management using behavior based attack
graphs. In: International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and
Computing, 2004. Proceedings. ITCC 2004. Vol. 1. tex.ids: dantu2004a
tex.citation-number: 111 ISSN: null. Apr. 2004, 445–449 Vol.1. doi:
10.1109/ITCC.2004.1286496.
[117] Davi, L., et al. Stitching the gadgets: On the ineffectiveness of coarse-grained
control-flow integrity protection. In: Proc. USENIX security symposium. Citation
Key: davi2014a. 2014, 401–416.
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[275] Morana, M. M., and Uceda Vélez, T. Risk centric threat modeling: process for
attack simulation and threat analysis. Wiley, 2015. isbn: 978-1-118-98835-0.
[276] Morris, A. S. Measurement and instrumentation principles.
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001. isbn: 978-0-7506-5081-6.
[277] Morrison, P., et al. Mapping the field of software life cycle security metrics.
Information and Software Technology 102 (Oct. 2018), 146–159. issn: 09505849.
doi: 10.1016/j.infsof.2018.05.011.
[278] Moses, T. Web services security quality of protection (2002). Citation Key:
moses2002a tex.citation-number: 61. url:
http://xml.coverpages.org/ni2002-09-21-a.html.
[279] MP Azuwa, A., Ahmad, R., and Sahib, S. Technical security metrics model in
compliance with ISO/IEC 27001 standard. International Journal of Cyber-Security
and Digital Forensics 1 (2012), 280–288.
159
[280] Musman, S., and Turner, A. A game theoretic approach to cyber security risk
management. The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications,
Methodology, Technology 15, 2 (Apr. 2018), 127–146. issn: 1548-5129, 1557-380X.
doi: 10.1177/1548512917699724.
[281] Muthukrishnan, K., and Malis, A. A Core MPLS IP VPN Architecture. url:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2917.
[282] Nappa, A., et al. The Attack of the Clones: A Study of the Impact of Shared
Code on Vulnerability Patching. In: 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. tex.ids: nappa2015a. May 2015, 692–708. doi: 10.1109/SP.2015.48.
[283] Nayak, K., et al. Some Vulnerabilities Are Different Than Others. In: vol. 8688.
tex.ids: nayak2014a. 2014, 426–446. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1\ 21. url:
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1%5C 21.
[284] Nessus The nessus security scanner (). Citation Key: nessus-a tex.citation-number:
85 tex.type: [Online]. url: http://www.nessus.org.
[285] Neupane, A., et al. A Multi-Modal Neuro-Physiological Study of Phishing
Detection and Malware Warnings. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS ’15. tex.ids:
neupane2015a. ACM Press, 2015, 479–491. isbn: 978-1-4503-3832-5. doi:
10.1145/2810103.2813660. url:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2810103.2813660.
[286] Nicol, D., Sanders, W., and Trivedi, K. Model-based evaluation: from
dependability to security. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
1, 1 (Jan. 2004). tex.ids: nicol2004a, nicolModelbasedEvaluationDependability2004a
tex.citation-number: 52, 48–65. issn: 2160-9209. doi: 10.1109/TDSC.2004.11.
[287] Nicol, D., et al. The science of security 5 hard problems (2015). Citation Key:
nicol2015a. url: http://cps-vo.org/node/21590..
160
[288] Niu, B., and Tan, G. Per-Input Control-Flow Integrity. In: Proceedings of the 22nd
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS ’15.
tex.ids: niu2015a. ACM Press, 2015, 914–926. isbn: 978-1-4503-3832-5. doi:
10.1145/2810103.2813644. url:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2810103.2813644.
[289] Noel, S. Text Mining for Modeling Cyberattacks. In: Handbook of Statistics. Jan.
2018. doi: 10.1016/bs.host.2018.06.001.
[290] Noel, S., and Jajodia, S. Managing attack graph complexity through visual
hierarchical aggregation. In: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Visualization
and data mining for computer security. tex.ids: noel2004a tex.citation-number: 87.
ACM, 2004, 109–118. url: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1029225.
[291] Noel, S., and Jajodia, S. Measuring Security Risk of Networks Using Attack
Graphs. 1, 1 (). tex.ids: noel2010a tex.citation-number: 99, 13.
[292] Noel, S., and Jajodia, S. Metrics suite for network attack graph analytics. In:
Proceedings of the 9th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference
on - CISR ’14. tex.ids: noel2014a, noelMetricsSuiteNetwork2014a. ACM Press,
2014, 5–8. isbn: 978-1-4503-2812-8. doi: 10.1145/2602087.2602117. url:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2602087.2602117.
[293] Oltramari, A., et al. Towards a Human Factors Ontology for Cyber Security (), 8.
[294] Ong, C., Nahrstedt, K., and Yuan, W. Quality of protection for mobile multimedia
applications. In: Multimedia and expo, 2003. ICME ’03. Proceedings. 2003
international conference on. Vol. 2. Citation Key: ong2003a tex.citation-number: 57.
July 2003, 137–40.
[295] Oppenheimer, D., et al. Practical Issues in Dependability Benchmarking (), 6.
[296] Oroojlooyjadid, A., et al. A Deep Q-Network for the Beer Game: A Deep
Reinforcement Learning algorithm to Solve Inventory Optimization Problems.
161
arXiv:1708.05924 [cs] (Feb. 2019). arXiv: 1708.05924. url:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05924.
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